應用賽局觀點探討以網路為基礎服務之策略性合作

李丞斌

doi:10.6846/TKU.2016.00098

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应用赛局观点探讨以网路为基础服务之策略性合作

A Game Theoretical Approach for Strategic Cooperation of Online Services

李丞斌 , 硕士　　导师：张玮伦　　

繁体中文 DOI： 10.6846/TKU.2016.00098

网路服务；传讯赛局；服务联盟； Online Service ； Signal Game ； Service Alliance

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摘要 │ 参考文献 (123) │ 国际计量

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Online services are increasingly flourishing decades. It is an important for online service providers and portal webiste or platfrom to improve customer value and increase browsing rate. In particular, mergers and acquisitions is the mainstream for online service field and certain platforms such as Google, Tripadvisor, or Facebookstarted to cooperate to other sevice providers to enhance customer value. According to the report of Mckinsey & Company’s (2000), 60% of failure rate in the tactical parnterships. This research proposes two research questions based on strategic cooperation. (1) whatis the criteria between platforms and online service provider before cooperation? (2) how to maintain the stability wihtin alliance and  what is the longterm incentive for partnership? 
Our framework is based on the concept of signaling game which is a dynamic game to solve the asymmetric information problems.  We use information richness as the type of online service providers and information intensity as the signals. Online service provider is the sender and the platform owner as a receiver. After receiving the signal, the receiver has to decide the best move for cooperation. For both of sender and receiver, we set five variables and assume the conditions for their movements in the game. This study proposed mathematical models and assumed the separating equilibrium and pooling by investigating the major factors in partnerships. In addition, past researches already used tangible variables to measure the senders’ type and payoffs. Our research integrated tangible and intangible variables to infer the type of sender and payoffs. The results of mathematical derivation showed the main incentives for cooperation are network externalities and users’ value. Once network externality and users’ values are greater than the costs, online service provider and platform owner may agree accept the cooperation. The network externality can increase the number of users for online service provider by cooperate with the platform owner. Platform owner not only can enhance the users’ value by providing online service to fit in users’ need, but also can increase the dependence on the platform. It is a win-win strategy for both sides. Finally, online service provider and platform owner have incentives for long-term partnerships which may be a concept of strategic alliance of online service.

参考文献 ( 123 ) 〈TOP〉

[1]. Aaker, D. A. (1990). Brand extensions: The good, the bad, and the ugly. Sloan Management Review, 31(4), 47-56.
连结：
[2]. Abdulkadiroglu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. The American Economic Review, 93(3), 729-747.
连结：
[4]. Aguirregabiria, V., & Mira, P. (2005). A genetic algorithm for the structural estimation of games with multiple equilibria. Unpublished Manuscript, Department of Economics, Boston University.[24],
连结：
[5]. Aumann, R. J., & Maschler, M. (1995). Repeated games with incomplete information MIT press.
连结：
[6]. Bajari, P., Benkard, C. L., & Levin, J. (2007). Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition. Econometrica, 75(5), 1331-1370.
连结：

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引用含有DOI的文献

DOI可强化引用精确性、增强学术圈连结，并给予使用者跨平台的良好使用经验，目前在全世界已有超过五千万个对象申请DOI。 如想对DOI的使用与概念有进一步了解，请参考 （ ） 。

DOI可强化引用精确性、增强学术圈连结，并给予使用者跨平台的良好使用经验，目前在全世界已有超过五千万个对象申请DOI。如想对DOI的使用与概念有进一步了解，请参考（）。