網路興起對品牌競爭廠商獨家與共同經銷決策影響之研究

The Impact of the Internet on the Optimal Channel Decisions by Competitive Firms

10.6504/JOM.2005.22.02.04

周善瑜(Shan-Yu Chou)；蕭櫓(Lu Hsiao)

多重通路訂價 ； 網際網路 ； 通路設計 ； 市場區隔 ； Multichannel Pricing ； The Internet Channel ； Channel Design ； Screening

管理學報

22卷2期（2005 / 04 / 01）

205 - 225

繁體中文

過去的研究顯示當彼此競爭的製造商透過一傳統之共同零售商（而非獨家經銷商）來經銷其產品時，雖然可降低其通路成本，但通常必須面對零售商的誘因問題：例如零售商可以透過在店內的遊說能力來影響消費者最終的購買決策。相反地，在網路上消費者的選擇較不容易受到他人影響而有較高的自主程度。本文嘗試分析網際網路之興起會如何影響廠商之通路與訂價策略。我們考慮兩家不完全競爭之製造商，面對市場中各自的忠誠顧客與遊移顧客，以賽局理論的分析方法探討製造商、零售商與消費者間的策略互動。研究結果發現網路的興起給予製造商透過不同通路區分消費者的機會，使得製造商彼此間有了協調行銷策略(目標市場、訂價以及通路策略)的空間，下游經銷商的誘因問題亦因而獲致相當程度的解決，進而增加製造商的利潤。例如當遊移顧客的重要性夠大且遊移顧客能夠上網的比例夠高而忠誠顧客能夠上網的比例夠低時，網路的興起將使得共同零售較之前更為普遍。此外，隨著忠誠顧客與遊移顧客能夠上網的相對比例不同，網路通路的存在將使得製造商擴大或縮減其目標市場。而當上網的人口隨著網路的日益興盛而不斷成長時，本文描述廠商應如何動態地調整其通路與訂價策略。

It has been acknowledged that manufacturers who distribute their products through a traditional common retailer (instead of exclusive retailers), often face the retailer's incentive problems, though enjoying some savings in channel costs. In particular, the traditional retailer can influence consumers' purchase decisions on the point of sales through its persuasion power. In contrast, on the Internet consumers are less persuasible and more in control. This paper attempts to study how the emergence of the Internet channel influences manufacturers' channel and pricing strategies. We build a game theoretical model where two symmetric manufacturers compete in a market which consists of loyal consumers and switchers. The valuations of switchers for brands may be influenced by a retailer. After the emergence of the Internet, the two manufacturers can choose whether to use the Internet channel, the traditional channel or both. Furthermore, each manufacturer has to decide whether to adopt exclusive dealing or common dealing for its chosen distribution channel(s). Before the emergence of the Internet, the importance of switchers determines the manufacturers' targeting markets, while the channel cost and the retailer's cost of persuading consumers influence manufacturers' choice between exclusive dealing and common dealing. After the emergence of the Internet, since manufacturers can induce Internet users to purchase on the Net, the manufacturers' optimal channel design and targeting strategies will depend on the proportions of Internet users within the markets of loyals and switchers. We find that the Internet channel allows manufacturers to better coordinate their targeting, pricing, and channel strategies, thereby minimizing the agency costs involved in common dealing at the traditional outlets, which in turn enhances the manufacturers' profits. In particular, when the importance of switchers and the proportion of switchers who can access the Internet are high enough, while the proportion of loyals who can access the Internet is low, then the emergence of the Internet channel makes common dealing more prevalent than before. Furthermore, in the presence of the Internet channel, the manufacturers may expand or narrow down their target markets, depending on the relative proportions of Internet users in the two segments. An optimal dynamic adjustment process is obtained which describes how a manufacturer should optimally change his channel and pricing strategies when the population of the Internet purchasers grows over time.

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