BOT計畫談判模式建構之研究

A Study of Model Construction of Negotiation for Build-Operate-Transfer Infrastructure Projects

10.6504/JOM.2005.22.06.06

林永盛(Yeong-Shen Lin)；張有恆(Yu-Hern Chang)

BOT ； 談判 ； 賽局理論 ； BOT ； Negotiation ； Game Theory

管理學報

22卷6期（2005 / 12 / 01）

783 - 804

繁體中文

BOT計畫之進行以「特許契約談判」為計畫之關鍵所在，假若特許契約談判不成，則BOT計畫即告終止，因此「特許契約談判」對於計畫能否推動影響甚鉅。而綜觀目前BOT計畫特許契約議約談判互動過程並無數學化模式可供參考，無法先前掌握重要資訊或重點因素要項，本研究用針對BOT計畫特許契約議約談判互動過程進行研究，並應用賽局理論發特許契約議約談判數學模型，模擬政府與特許團隊的特許契約談判協商過程，探討雙方之談判成本、學習效果、時間折現、收斂量效用乘數等因子對於談判過程、結果及談判時間之影響與其政策意義，以供契約談判應用參考，俾易達成談判協商共識。

This paper presents a study on the negotiation process of BOT projects by using game theory to establish mathematic models for concession contract negotiation simulating the negotiation process between government and a concessionaire. This investigates the influences of the factors such as time pressure, negotiating cost, anticipated concessionary strategies, learning effects, discount factors, convergent quantity utility multiplier etc, on the negotiating process, results and times and the roles that these factors play in the future policy implementation. This is for purpose of contract negotiation reference to helping both parties reach agreement more easily during negotiation. To date no mathematic models have yet been developed for negotiating BOT projects. It is impossible to ascertain what are the important information and key elements in advance. This has made the negotiating process long and inefficient, and in some cases failures of negotiation have even called off projects. To work out this problem, this study uses game theory to establish mathematic models for contract negotiation simulating the negotiating process between government and a concessionaire. This investigates the influences on the negotiating process, results and times and the roles that these factors play in the future policy implementation. This is for purpose of contract negotiation reference. This is the objective of the study. A transit system BOT project in a city is used as the study case for the mathematic models of contract negotiation between government and a private sector established in this paper When the government and the private sector are negotiating on the issue of ”After the commencement of operation of the Project, what percentage of its after-tax profit shall the private sector deposit into the Stabilization Fund annually”, an example demonstrates that this model is suitable for asymmetric conditions. This can achieve a negotiated balanced convergent quantity and a utility value, and predict the number of negotiation phases. This model can be used as a reference for future contract negotiation. The conclusions drawn from the study are as follows: 1. The example for the asymmetric model used in this article shows that, with the increase in the number of negotiation phases, the mutual expected concession rates between the government and the private sector become less and less in each phase. The government's expected quantity is decreased phase by phase while the private sector's is increased, and the utilities of both the government and the private sector are decreased phase by phase. The future policy implementation then will be that the faster the completion of the negotiation between the government and the private sector is, the better for both of them, and, conversely, the longer, the more disadvantageous to both of them. 2. The results of the sensitivity analysis on the negotiator's learning effect show that, with the increase in private sector's negotiation learning effect, the number of phases required for both sides to complete a negotiation was decreased, the balanced convergent quantity was increased, and the utilities of both the government and the private sector were increased. The future policy implementation will then be that through training and education in negotiating practice or theory, both the government and the private sector can increase their learning effect during practice of negotiation that helps increase the utilities of both the government and the private sector. Therefore, training and education in negotiating practice or theory is something good for everyone and it is worthwhile for governments and private sectors to provide training courses for their staff 3. The results of the cost sensitivity analysis on the negotiation by the negotiator show that, with the increase of private sector's negotiation cost in each phase, number of phases required for both sides to complete a negotiation was decreased, the balanced convergent quantity was increased, and the utilities of both the government and the private sector were increased. The future policy implementation then will be that the more the private sector negotiation cost in each phase, the more adverse to its negotiation. At the balanced convergent point, the utility of the private sector is decreased while that of the government is increased so that the situation favours the government and the private sector should do their best to reduce negotiation cost in each phase. 4. The results of the sensitivity analysis on the negotiator's convergent quantity utility multiplier show that, with the decrease of private sector's convergent quantity utility multiplier, the required number of phases for both sides to complete a negotiation was decreased, the balanced convergent quantity was increased, and the utilities of both the government and the private sector were increased. The future policy implementation then will be that less convergent quantity utility multiplier means the convergent quantity obtained through negotiation exerts little influence on the utility, namely, the situation is against the private sector. Therefore, concession (increased monotonously) in convergent quantity is required in order to reduce the number of phases that can increase private sector's utility. It is obvious that, when the private sector s convergent quantity utility multiplier is less, it is worthwhile for them to concede the convergent quantity in order to reduce the number of phases. 5. The results of the sensitivity analysis on the negotiator's discount factors show that, with the increase of private sector's discount factors, the required time for both sides to complete a negotiation was decreased, the balanced convergent quantity was increased, and the utilities of both the government and the private sector were increased. The future policy implementation then will be that larger private sector's discount factors means the private sector prefers near-term to long-term, namely, they tend to be less patient on time and the private sector has the pressure of trying their best to reduce the number of negotiation phases. Therefore, they have to concede the convergent quantity in order to reduce the number of phases to increase private sector's utility. It is obvious that, when the private sector's discount factor is larger, it is worthwhile for them to concede convergent quantity in order to reduce the number of phases.

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