题名

董事會政治連結對法人說明會的影響

并列篇名

The Impact of Political Connection on Conference Calls

DOI

10.6504/JOM.2017.34.01.04

作者

翁慈青(Tzu-Ching Weng);曾家璿(Chia-Hsuan Tseng);陳怡秀(Yi-Shiou Chen)

关键词

董事會 ; 政治連結 ; 法人說明會 ; 資訊透明度 ; Board of Directors ; Political Connection ; Conference Calls ; Information Transparency

期刊名称

管理學報

卷期/出版年月

34卷1期(2017 / 03 / 01)

页次

85 - 118

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

本研究以2008年至2011年之台灣上市櫃公司為樣本,探討公司董事會成員政治連結與召開法人說明會之關聯。本研究定義政治連結為若公司董事會任何一位成員曾經歷年或現在擔任中央政府官員、民意代表或政黨黨職則具有政治連結。研究結果發現當董事會成員具有政治連結時,召開法人說明會之意願較低,表示當董事會中存在政治人物時,會比較不願意進行自願性揭露,以避免受社會較多關注與監督。此外,若只以有召開法說會之公司為樣本,本研究發現當董事會具有政治連結時,會在法說會中提供較完整的資訊,由此推測,具有政治背景之董事們,在承受較多外部關注與監督下,一旦決定召開法人說明會,反而揭露的程度較高,藉此消弭投資人對其政治影響力之疑慮。本研究進一步發現不同的政治職位,對公司法人說明會召開的意願及揭露程度亦有不同的影響。

英文摘要

This paper tests the relation between political connection of board members and conference calls. We use Taiwanese listed firms as our sample and collect political background data of board members from 2008 to 2011. We define a board is politically connected if a specific member is or was a central government official, an elected representative, or holding a post in a political party. We find that politically connected boards are less willing to hold conference calls. This result suggests that firms with board members with political backgrounds are more likely to restrict information outflows to avoid public attention or lower monitoring from outsiders. Using a sample including only firms that hold conference calls, we find that firms with politically connected boards give more information in the conferences relative to firms without political boards. We conjecture this is probably because politically connected boards attract more public attention and once they decide to hold a conference, they tend to disclosure more information in the conference in order to reduce outsiders' concerns toward its political influences. Moreover, we find that each type of political position affects differently on the holding of conference calls and the information disclosed in the conferences.

主题分类 社會科學 > 管理學
参考文献
  1. 紀信義、翁慈青、黃馨儀(2016)。董事會政治關連與財務報表重編之關係。中山管理評論,24(3),409-445。
    連結:
  2. 翁慈青、紀信義(2014)。董事會政治背景與企業信用風險之關係。證券市場發展季刊,26(2),43-90。
    連結:
  3. 陳瑞斌、許崇源(2007)。公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究。交大管理學報,27(2),55-109。
    連結:
  4. 程心瑤(2011)。公司治理與企業責任報告之揭露。會計評論,52,35-76。
    連結:
  5. 黃玉麗、沈中華、林昆立(2012)。政治關聯(係)與債務資金成本。管理學報,29(2),155-185。
    連結:
  6. 黃劭彥、張森河、王登仕、李怡葶(2014)。法人說明會內容對未來盈餘反應係數的影響。會計審計論叢,4(2),29-58。
    連結:
  7. 黃劭彥、鍾宇軒、王元章(2014)。董事會特性是否影響公司財務盈餘預測型態與指引精確性的選擇?。證券市場發展季刊,26(3),1-46。
    連結:
  8. 廖益興、陳彥綺、王貞靜(2011)。年報資訊揭露與資訊不對稱:來自私有資訊交易之證據。經濟研究,47(1),45-96。
    連結:
  9. 鍾宇軒、黃劭彥、戚務君(2013)。法人說明會對企業資訊不對稱的影響。管理學報,30(4),295-322。
    連結:
  10. 經濟日報,2015。台積大立光法說 多頭指標。7 月12日。
  11. Ramalho, R. 2007. The persistence of corruption: Evidence from the 1992 presidential impeachment in Brazil. Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC.
  12. Faccio, M. 2007. The characteristics of politically connected firms. Working paper, Purdue University, IN.
  13. 經濟日報,2015。台積下修景氣 ADR 先跌後穩。7 月17 日。
  14. Sunder, S. V. 2002. Investor access to conference call disclosures: Impact of regulation fair disclosure on information asymmetry. Working Paper, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL.
  15. Abbott, L. J.,Parker, S.,Peters, G. F.(2004).Audit committee characteristics and restatements.Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,23(1),69-87.
  16. Adhikari, A.,Derashid, C.,Zhang, H.(2006).Public policy, political connections, and effective tax rates: Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,25(5),574-595.
  17. Agrawal, A.,Chadha, S.(2005).Corporate governance and accounting scandals.Journal of Law and Economics,48(2),371-406.
  18. Agrawal, A.,Knoeber, C. K.(2001).Do some outside directors play a political role?.Journal of Law and Economics,44(1),179-198.
  19. Aier, J. K.,Comprix, J.,Gunlock, M. T.,Lee, D.(2005).The financial expertise of CFOs and accounting restatements.Accounting Horizons,19(3),123-135.
  20. Archambault, J. J.,Archambault, M. E.(2003).A multinational test of determinants of corporate disclosure.The International Journal of Accounting,38(2),173-194.
  21. Bliss, M. A.,Gul, F. A.(2012).Political connection and cost of debts: Some Malaysian evidence.Journal of Banking and Finance,36(5),1520-1527.
  22. Bloomfield, R. J.,Wilks, T. J.(2000).Disclosure effects in the laboratory: Liquidity, depth, and the cost of capital.The Accounting Review,75(1),13-41.
  23. Botosan, C. A.(1997).Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital.The Accounting Review,72(3),323-349.
  24. Botosan, C. A.,Plumlee, M. A.(2002).A Re-examination of disclosure level and the expected cost of equity capital.Journal of Accounting Research,40(1),21-40.
  25. Boubakri, N.,Cosset, J. C.,Saffar, W.(2008).Political connections of newly privatized firms.Journal of Corporate Finance,14(5),654-673.
  26. Bowen, R. M.,Davis, A. K.,Matsumoto, D. A.(2002).Do conference calls affect analysts' forecasts?.The Accounting Review,77(2),285-316.
  27. Brown, S.,Hillegeist, S. A.,Lo, K.(2004).Conference calls and information asymmetry.Journal of Accounting and Economics,37(3),343-366.
  28. Bushee, B. J.,Matsumoto, D. A.,Miller, G. S.(2003).Open versus closed conference calls: The determinants and effects of broadening access to disclosure.Journal of Accounting and Economics,34(1-3),149-180.
  29. Bushman, R. M.,Piotroski, J. D.,Smith, A. J.(2004).What determines corporate transparency?.Journal of Accounting Research,42(2),207-252.
  30. Cerf, R. A.(1961).Corporate reporting and investment decisions.Berkeley, California:The University of California Press.
  31. Chan, K. H.,Lin, K. Z.,Mo, P. L. L.(2006).A political-economic analysis of auditor reporting and auditor switches.Review of Accounting Studies,11(1),21-48.
  32. Chaney, P. K.,Faccio, M.,Parsley, D.(2011).The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms.Journal of Accounting and Economics,51(1-2),58-76.
  33. Chen, C. J. P.,Ding, Y.,Kim, C.(2010).High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world.Journal of International Business Studies,41(9),1505-1524.
  34. Cheng, S.(2008).Board size and the variability of corporate performance.Journal of Financial Economics,87(1),157-176.
  35. Chin, C. L.,Kleinman, G.,Lee, P.,Lin, M. F.(2006).Corporate ownership structure and accuracy and bias of mandatory earnings forecast: Evidence from Taiwan.Journal of International Accounting Research,5(2),41-62.
  36. Correia, M. M.(2014).Political connections and SEC enforcement.Journal of Accounting and Economics,57(2-3),241-262.
  37. Daykin, A. R.,Moffatt, P. G.(2002).Analyzing ordered responses: A review of the ordered probit model.Understanding Statistics,1(3),157-166.
  38. DeFond, M. L.,Hann, R. N.,Hu, X.(2005).Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors?.Journal of Accounting Research,43(2),153-193.
  39. Drope, J. M.,Hansen, W. L.(2004).Purchasing protection? The effect of political spending on U.S. trade policy.Political Research Quarterly,57(1),27-37.
  40. Duchin, R.,Sosyura, D.(2012).The politics of government investment.Journal of Financial Economics,106(1),24-48.
  41. Faccio, M.(2006).Politcally connected firms.American Economic Review,96(1),369-386.
  42. Fama, E. F.,Jensen, M. C.(1983).Separation of ownership and control.Journal of Law and Economics,26(2),301-325.
  43. Fan, J. P. H.,Wong, T. J.(2005).Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia.Journal of Accounting Research,43(1),35-72.
  44. Fich, E. M.,Shivdasani, A.(2006).Are busy boards effective monitors?.Journal of Finance,61(2),689-724.
  45. Fisman, R.(2001).Estimating the value of political connections.American Economic Review,91(4),1095-1102.
  46. Francis, J. R.,Khurana, I. K.,Pereira, R.(2005).Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of capital around the world.The Accounting Review,80(4),1125-1162.
  47. Francis, J.,Nanda, D.,Olsson, P.(2008).Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital.Journal of Accounting Research,46(1),53-99.
  48. Frankel, R.,Johnson, M.,Skinner, D. J.(1999).An empirical examination of conference calls as voluntary disclosure medium.Journal of Accounting Research,37(1),133-150.
  49. Fraser, D. R.,Zhang, H.,Derashid, C.(2006).Capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia.Journal of Banking and Finance,30(4),1291-1308.
  50. Gelb, D. S.,Strawser, J. A.(2001).Corporate social responsibility and financial disclosures: An alternative explanation for increased disclosure.Journal of Business Ethics,33(1),1-13.
  51. Goldman, E.,Rocholl, J.,So, J.(2009).Do politically connected boards affect firm value?.Review of Financial Studies,22(6),2331-2360.
  52. Goyal, V.,Park, C.(2002).Board leadership structure and CEO turnover.Journal of Corporate Finance,8(1),49-66.
  53. Guedhami, O.,Pittman, J. A.,Saffar, W.(2014).Auditor choice in politically connected firms.Journal of Accounting Research,52(1),107-162.
  54. Hail, L.(2002).The impact of voluntary corporate disclosures on the ex-ante cost of capital for Swiss firms.The European Accounting Review,11(4),741-773.
  55. Healy, P. M.,Palepu, K. G.(2001).Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature.Journal of Accounting and Economics,31(1-3),405-440.
  56. Healy, P. M.,Wahlen, J. M.(1999).A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting.Accounting Horizons,13(4),365-383.
  57. Hollander, S.,Pronk, M.,Roelofsen, E.(2010).Does silence speak? An empirical analysis of disclosure choice during conference calls.Journal of Accounting Research,48(3),531-563.
  58. Hughes, P. J.(1986).Signaling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information.Journal of Accounting and Economics,8(2),119-142.
  59. Huson, M. R.,Parrino, R.,Starks, L. T.(2001).Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: A longterm perspective.Journal of Finance,56(6),2265-2297.
  60. Jensen, M. C.,Meckling, W. H.(1976).The theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure.Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360.
  61. Johnson, S.,Mitton, T.(2003).Cronyism and capital controls: Evidence from Malaysia.Journal of Financial Economics,67(2),351-382.
  62. Kanagaretnam, K.,Lobo, G. J.,Whalen, D. J.(2007).Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements?.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,26(4),497-522.
  63. Khan, M. H.(Ed.),Jomo, K. S.(Ed.)(2000).Rents, rent-seeking and economic development: Theory and evidence in Asia.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
  64. Khwaja, A. I.,Mian, A.(2005).Do lenders favor politically connected firms? Rent provision in an emerging financial market.The Quarterly Journal of Economics,120(4),1371-1411.
  65. Kimbrough, M. D.,Louis, H.(2011).Voluntary disclosure to influence investor reactions to merger announcements: An examination of conference calls.The Accounting Review,86(2),637-667.
  66. Kose, J.,Senbet, L. W.(1998).Corporate governance and board effectiveness.Journal of Banking and Finance,22(4),371-403.
  67. Lang, M. H.(1998).Discussion of bridging the information gap: Quarterly conference calls as a medium for voluntary disclosure.Review of Accounting Studies,3(1),169-173.
  68. Leuz, C.,Oberholzer-Gee, F.(2006).Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia.Journal of Financial Economics,81(2),411-439.
  69. Li, H.,Meng, L.,Wang, Q.,Zhou, L. A.(2008).Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms.Journal of Development Economics,87(2),283-299.
  70. Matsumoto, D.,Pronk, M.,Roelofsen, E.(2011).What makes conference calls useful? The information content of managers' presentations and analysts' discussion sessions.The Accounting Review,86(4),1383-1414.
  71. Piotroski, J. D.,Wong, T. J.,Zhang, T.(2015).Political incentives to suppress negative information: Evidence from Chinese listed firms.Journal of Accounting Research,53(2),405-459.
  72. Rajan, R. G.,Zingales, L.(1998).Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis.Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,11(3),40-48.
  73. Sengupta, P.(1998).Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt.The Accounting Review,73(4),459-474.
  74. Shleifer, A.,Vishny, R. W.(1994).Large shareholders and corporate control.Journal of Accounting Political Economy,94(3),461-488.
  75. Srinidhi, B.,Zhang, H.,Zhang, T.(2010).Political connection, transparency and auditor choice: Evidence from family-owned firms in China.the 4th Symposium of China Journal of Accounting Research,Beijing:
  76. Verrecchia, R. E.(1983).Discretionary disclosure.Journal of Accounting and Economics,5,179-194.
  77. Walker, G. R.,Reid, T.(2002).Upgrading corporate governance in East Asia: Part 1.Journal of International Banking Law,17(3),59-66.
  78. Watts, R. L.,Zimmerman, J. L.(1983).Agency problems, auditing, and the theory of the firm: Some evidence.Journal of Law and Economics,26(3),613-633.
  79. Wong, S. H. W.(2010).Political connections and firm performance: The case of Hong Kong.Journal of East Asian Studies,10(2),275-314.
  80. Zahra, S. A.,Pearce, J. A.(1989).Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrated model.Journal of Management,15(2),291-334.
  81. 王建文(2015)。協助上市公司辦好法說會。證券服務,639,28-31。
  82. 史建倫(2005)。國立臺灣大學會計學研究所。
  83. 李建然、廖秀梅、賴柏錚(2005)。法人說明會之資訊內涵及公平性。中華管理評論國際學報,8(3),1-17。
  84. 金成隆、林美鳳、梁嘉紋(2008)。公司治理結構和法人說明會之關聯性研究。管理學報,25(2),221-243。
  85. 金成隆、紀信義、林裕凱(2005)。強制性財務預測與法人說明會關聯性之研究。管理學報,22(5),629-651。
  86. 張翔一(2007)。顏慶章掌駝 元大金控雙突圍。天下雜誌,382,112-116。
  87. 陳昶宇(2009)。國立臺北大學會計學研究所。
  88. 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩(2002)。公司治理與評等系統。台北:商智文化事業股份有限公司。
  89. 羅黨論、劉曉龍(2009)。政治關係、進入壁壘與企業績效─來自中國民營上市公司的經驗證據。管理世界,5,97-106。
被引用次数
  1. 董夢杭,寇家瑜(2018)。再探企業政治連結的價值:企業醜聞中的政商關係。管理學報,35(4),481-501。
  2. 黃劭彥,陳玲娜,康照宗,王登仕(2022)。法人說明會影音內容對盈餘管理之影響。管理與系統,29(3),337-361。
  3. 黃郁婷,黃劭彥,許美滿,林佳慧(2020)。自願性法人說明會影音資訊與負債資金成本之關聯性。東吳經濟商學學報,101,1-39。
  4. 蕭名欽,邱彥毅(2020)。董事政治連結及其受關注程度與公司避稅之關聯性。當代會計,21(2),185-218。
  5. 葉淑玲,吳叢楷(2023)。公司之審計網絡中心性對盈餘資訊性與股價同步性之影響。會計審計論叢,13(2),41-74。