在信用擔保機制下供應具不確定性時之議價模式研究

A Bargaining Model with Supply Uncertainty under Credit Guarantee Mechanism

10.6504/JOM.2017.34.02.04

蔣明晃(David Ming-Huang Chiang)；葉哲瑋(Che-Wei Yeh)

供應鏈管理 ； 信用擔保機制 ； 議價模式 ； Supply Chain Management ； Credit Guarantee Mechanism ； Bargaining Model

管理學報

34卷2期（2017 / 06 / 01）

215 - 230

繁體中文

為了滿足顧客訂單，供應鏈許多規模較大的零售商採取外包的方式將訂單交付給規模較小的供應商進行生產；然而這些規模小的供應商常面臨到資金不足的因素，而無法順利交貨甚至違約，進而影響整體供應鏈的營運與利益。因此本研究目的在提出一種信用擔保機制，協助供應商進行融資，並以供應鏈的角度去探討，在這個機制下上下游間的議價行為。在此機制下通常以供應鏈的下游且通常規模較大的零售商做為信用擔保機制的發起者，由零售商幫供應商向銀行做信用擔保使得供應商能有較低的資金成本，並透過議價的機制使整體供應鏈的整體效用能夠提升。本研究的研究結果顯示供應商與零售商應更緊密合作，如此才能增進整體供應鏈利益，使雙方效用增加；此外零售商與銀行議定信用擔保機制時應更謹慎議定貸款成數，過高或過低的貸款成數都將損害整體供應鏈的利益。

Nowadays, supply chain usually develops a model that a retailer outsources its order to smaller suppliers to meet the customer's demand. Unfortunately, suppliers often face the problem of lacking financial support, which leads them unable to deliver their product to retailer on time or to violate the contract. When it happens, it will erode the whole supply chain's operation effectiveness and its own profit. This research proposes a credit guarantee mechanism in which the bargaining behavior between a supplier and a retailer is discussed. This mechanism is initiated by the retailer actively such that the supplier can borrow the financial support from bank to cover its manufacturing cost. By doing this, we hope that the total supply chain's profit and welfare can increase. Our research shows that the retailer and the supplier should cooperate much more tightly with each other to increase the whole supply chain's profit. Besides, the retailer and the bank should pay much more attention to decide the loan-to-value (LTV) when a credit guarantee mechanism is setup since the value of LTV will have greatly impact on whole supply chain's profit.

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