Advantages and Limitations of President Ma's Cross-Strait Negotiation: CECA/ECFA as an Example

馬英九總統兩岸談判的優勢與限制：以CECA／ECFA為例

10.6431/TWJHSS.201109.0059

徐斯儉(Szu-Chien Hsu)

ECFA ； 兩岸經濟合作架構協議 ； 兩岸關係 ； 馬英九 ； ECFA ； Cross-Strait Relations ； Ma Ying-Jeo

思與言：人文與社會科學期刊

49卷3期（2011 / 09 / 01）

55 - 94

英文

在有關「衝突策略」的討論中，Thomas Schelling指出，假如正在進行國際談判的執政者，刻意地運用其在國內所受的限制，那麼在對外談判中會有較大籌碼。類似的觀點也在Robert Putnam的「雙層賽局模型」中提出。這一模型認為，當一國內部的贏方和國際上的對手打交道時，此種外交談判的情境就會出現。Putnam也指出，當一國內的贏方相對上沒那麼強勢時，在對外談判的過程中反而會有好處。這篇論文以雙層賽局模型以及Schelling的觀點作為分析架構，檢視馬英九總統就CECA或ECFA和北京的協商過程。本文發現了若干個尚未被雙層賽局模型檢驗過的潛在預設。這些發現可以幫助我們暸解，馬英九總統和北京進行CECA或ECFA協商策略的成功之處與限制所在，同時也有助於審視雙層賽局理論模型本身。

In the ”Strategy of Conflict”, Schelling conjectured that if an executive intentionally ties hi s or her hands with domestic constraints， he or she may gain greater leverage in international bargaining. A similar point has also been raised by Robert Putnam with his ”two-level game model”. This model argues that such a diplomatic bargain can be reached when domestic win-set intersects with the international one. Putnam also argues that when a domestic win-set is small, it can be a bargaining advantage for the negotiator. This paper intends to re view President Ma Ying-Jeou's bargaining process with Beijing on the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Arrangement (CECA) or Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with the analytic framework of two-level game and the Schelling Conjecture. This paper finds some implicit assumptions that are not well examined by the two-level game model. These findings may help us understand the success and limitations of President Ma's negotiation strategy with Beijing on CECA/ECFA, and also help us review the theoretical model of the two-level game.

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