题名

美國選區劃分之合憲性爭議：以政治問題為核心

并列篇名

The Constitutionality of U. S. Districting: Focusing on Political Question

作者

許炳華(Pin-Hua Hsu)

关键词

選區劃分 ； 政黨傑利蠑螈 ； 結社自由 ； 選舉權 ； 平等保護 ； 可司法性 ； 司法上可供操作之標準 ； 政治問題原則 ； districting ； partisan gerrymandering ； right of association ； right to vote ； equal protection ； justiciability ； judicially manageable standards ； political question doctrine

期刊名称

東吳法律學報

卷期/出版年月

34卷1期（2022 / 07 / 01）

页次

1 - 39

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

美國之「政黨傑利蠑螈」現象，乃透過劃分選區來獨惠特定政黨之實務運作，經由「集中選票」將特定選民集中在某一選區，使其支持之候選人以過高之選票當選，或以「分散選票」將特定選民分散在不同選區，使其支持之候選人均落選。此等選制運作被認為是對於美國民主之詛咒，因其破毀民主之正當性，使政治勢力根深蒂固。在2019年的最後一個會期，最高法院在Rucho v. Common Cause案宣稱該案之爭議為政治問題，非聯邦法院得以審理，終結了35年來司法實務找尋評價政黨傑利蠑螈可操作性標準之嘗試。然政黨傑利蠑螈侵害民主成功之健全及生機，不公平之選區劃分有效率地剝奪百萬美國人行使選舉權，使基本之民主原則崩潰，最新之Rucho案在2019年6月宣告不再受理該等政治問題，雖然為先前政黨傑利蠑螈可司法性之紛擾畫下句點，然可預見地，此後將由政黨來完全主導選區劃分。或許將政黨傑利蠑螈之爭議以其政治性而擱置不受理，相對而言較為容易，然而Rucho案恐怕無法經得起時間之考驗，其引發之憲政危機相當深邃，對於民主之影響則至為嚴重，不過，反思回來，政黨傑利蠑螈之爭議固然是個問題，然是否將其保留給政治過程來處理亦為一個妥適之選項。
英文摘要

Partisan gerrymandering is the practice of drawing voting districts to favor one political party over the other. Partisan gerrymanders reduce the power of voters by ＂packing＂ them into districts that win by excessive margins and by ＂cracking＂ voters across multiple districts that each lose by slim margins. Partisan gerrymandering is anathema to American democracy. It undermines democratic legitimacy, entrenches political power. In one of last term's most consequential cases, Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that ＂partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts＂, ending a thirty-five-year search for a manageable framework through which to evaluate partisan gerrymanders under the Equal Protection Clause. Partisan gerrymandering undermines the health and vitality of a successful democracy. Unfairly drawn maps effectively deprive millions of Americans from exercising their right to vote, striking at foundational democratic principles. The Supreme Court's political question holding in Rucho v. Common Cause was the predictable endpoint of decades of confusion over the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims. But it was also the foreseeable consequence of the Court's decision to allow partisan interests to dominate the redistricting process. It would be rather easy to dismiss partisan gerrymandering as ＂politics as usual.＂. Rucho v. Common Cause will not stand the test of time. Its contradictions and flawed reasoning are too plain; its constitutional tensions too deep, and its implications for democracy too dire. Partisan gerrymandering is a problem. But maybe there are good reasons to think that the political process is the better place to address this problem.
主题分类 社會科學 > 法律學
参考文献
  1. 王保鍵(2020)。選舉制度與族群政治：以新竹縣立法委員選區劃分為例。選舉研究，27(2)，1-48。
    連結：
  2. 李念祖(2000)。再論「政治問題」理論在我國憲法解釋上之運用。臺大法學論叢，29(2)，43-77。
    連結：
  3. 郭銘松(2001)。違憲審查機制解決政治僵局可能性之評估—以司法院大法官針對政治部門權限爭議之解釋為中心。臺大法學論叢，30(2)，251-289。
    連結：
  4. 經濟日報網頁，https://money.udn.com/money/story/5628/6071855?from=edn_maintab_cate最後瀏覽日：2022/02/04。
  5. 苦勞網，https://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/66101，最後瀏覽日：2021/10/11。
  6. 馬祖資訊網，https://www.matsu.idv.tw/topicdetail.php? f=1&t=51316，最後瀏覽日：2021/10/11。
  7. 奇摩新聞網，https://tw.news.yahoo.com/news/，最後瀏覽日：2022/02/05。
  8. Aguilera, Abigail(2018).Drawing the Line: Whitford v. Gill and the Search for Manageable Partisan Gerrymandering Standards.U. CIN. L. REV.,86,775-795.
  9. Barrow, John(2018).A Way Out of the Political Thicket: The Simple Solution to PartisanGerrymandering.Harv. J. on Legis,55,1-21.
  10. BICKEL, ALEXANDER M.(1962).THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS.
  11. Bickel, Alexander M.(1961).The Supreme Court 1960 Term: Foreword: The Passive Virtues.HARV. L. REV,75,40-79.
  12. Binimow, Jason B.(2018).Partisan Gerrymandering as Violating of First Amendment.A.m L. R. FED. 3D ART,37,7-35.
  13. Bondurant, Emmet(2021).Rucho v. Common Cause—A Critique.EMORY L. J.,70,1049-1089.
  14. Bondurant, Emmet J., II,Thorpe, Ben W.(2018).The First Amendment Case Against PartisanGerrymandering.GA. L. REV.,52,1039-1055.
  15. Briffault, Richard(2005).Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan Gerrymandering.CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y.,14,397-421.
  16. Briffault, Richard(2014).Three Questions for the "Right to Vote" Amendment.WM.&MARYBILL RTS. J.,23,27-46.
  17. Brobson, Hon. P. Kevin(2020).Of Free and Equal Elections and Fair Districts - How the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Slayed (or Hobbled?) the Partisan Gerrymander.WIDENER COMMW. L. REV.,30,53-97.
  18. CHOPER, JESSE H.(1980).JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS.
  19. Colton, Robert(2017).Back to the Drawing Board: Revisiting the Supreme Court’s Stance onPartisan Gerrymandering.FORDHAM L. REV,86,1303-1329.
  20. Cover, Benjamin Plener(2020).Rucho for Minimalists.MERCER L. REV.,71,695-718.
  21. Cover, Benjamin Plener(2018).Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering: An Evaluation of theEfficiency Gap Proposal.STAN. L. REV.,70,1131-2332.
  22. Cunningham, McKay(2018).Gerrymandering and Conceit: The Supreme Court’s Conflict withItself.HASTINGS L. J.,69,1509-1544.
  23. Dimino, Michael R.(2020).You’ve Got (Political) Questions? We’ve Got No Answers.MERCERL. REV.,71,719-733.
  24. Douglas, Joshua A.(2008).Is the Right to Vote Really Fundmental?.CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y,18,143-201.
  25. Driver, Justin(2005).Rules, the New Standards: Partisan Gerrymandering and JudicialManageability after Vieth V. Jubelirer.GEO. WASH. L. REV.,73,1166-1192.
  26. Eisler, Jacob(2018).Partisan Gerrymandering and the Illusion of Unfairness.CATH. U. L. REV.,67,229-279.
  27. Eisler, Jacob(2019).Partisan Gerrymandering and the Constitutionalization of Statistics.EMORYL. J.,68,979-1034.
  28. Esposito, Christopher(2020).Gerrymandering and the Meandering of Our Democratic Principles:Combating Partisan Gerrymandering after Rucho.S. CAL. INTER. L. J.,30,195-218.
  29. Fallon, Richard(2006).Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning.HARV. L. REV.,119,1274-1332.
  30. Fazel, Christian(2019).Partisan Gerrymandering: Finally Addressing a Two Hundred Thirty Year Challenge.Charleston L. Rev.,13,345-364.
  31. Findley, Joseph(2019).Partisan Gerrymandering and the Show Me State: Applying the Standardin Whitford v. Gill to the Context of Missouri’s State and Congressional Districts.UMKC L. REV.,88,181-210.
  32. Foley, Edward B.(2018).The Gerrymander and the Constitution: Two Avenues of Analysis andthe Quest for a Durable Precedent.WM.&MARY L. REV.,59,1729-1785.
  33. Foster. Mikayla(2018).“Gobbledygook” or Unconstitutional Redistricting?: Floterial Districts and Partisan Gerrymandering.B. U. L. REV.,98,1737-1780.
  34. Galloway, Russell W.(1991).Basic Free Speech Analysis.SANTA CLARA L. REV.,31,883-934.
  35. Gentithes, Michael(2020).Gobbledygook: Political Questions, Manageability, & Partisan Gerrymandering.IWOA L. REV.,105,1081-1125.
  36. Gliozzo, Nina Rose(2019).Judicial Embrace of Racial Gerrymandering Cases.HASTINGSL. J.,70,1331-1353.
  37. Hessick, F. Andrew(2015).Cases, Controversies, and Diversity.NW. U. L. REV.,109,57-108.
  38. Hill, Frances R.(2021).Partisan Gerrymanders: Upholding Voter Suppression and ChoosingJudicial Abdication in Rucho v. Common Cause.U. MIAMI L. REV.,75,459-508.
  39. Issacharoff, Samuel(2002).Gerrymandering and Political Cartels.HARV. L. REV.,116,593-648.
  40. Kallis, Peter(2021).The Boerne-Rucho Conundrum: Nonjusticiability, Section 5, and PartisanGerrymandering.Harvard Law & Policy Review,15
  41. Kato, Nick(2019).Pennsylvania’s Freedom of Expression Clause and Partisan Gerrymandering.TEMP. L. REV.,91,365-406.
  42. Keraga, Kyle(2020).Drawing the Line: A First Amendment Framework for Partisan Gerrymanderingin the Wake of Rucho v. Common Cause.MD. L. R.,79,798-835.
  43. Khokher, Aroosa(2020).Free and Equal Elections: A New State Constitutionalism for PartisanGerrymandering.COLUM. HOME. RTS. L. REV.,52,1-34.
  44. Kim, Yunsieg P.,Chen, Jowei(2021).Gerrymandered by Definition: The Distortion of“Traditional” Districting Principles and a Proposal for an Empirical Redefinition.WIS. L. REV.,2021,101-186.
  45. Kolodny, Niko(2019).What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Gerrymandering?.SAN DIEGO L. REV.,56,1013-1038.
  46. Larson, Taylor,Duden, Joshua A.(2019).The Ballot Box: A Pathway to Greater Success inAddressing Political. Gerrymandering Through State Courts.CUNY L. REV.,22,104-123.
  47. Lawrence, Hayley N.(2021).A Comparative Study of the Political Question Doctrine in theContext of Political System Failures: The United States and The United Kingdom.DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &PUBLIC POLICY,16,213-243.
  48. Muller, Derek T.(2019).Nonjudicial Solutions to Partisan Gerrymandering.HOW. L. J.,62,791-808.
  49. Neal, Colin(2020).Not Gill-ty: Challenging and Providing a Workable Alternative to the SupremeCourt’s Gerrymandering Standing Analysis in Gill v. Whitford.WM.&MARYBILL RTS. J.,28,831-864.
  50. Nickel, Rebekah(2020).Rucho v. Common Cause: The Covernment Game of Hot Potato.DENV. L. REV.,98,229-263.
  51. Nordstrand, Sara N.(2018).The Unwelcome Obligation : Why Neither State nor Federal CourtsShould Draw District Lines.FORDHAM L. REV.,86,1997-2027.
  52. Parsons, G. Michael(2020).Gerrymandering & Justiciability: The Political Question DoctrineAfter Rucho v. Common Cause.IND. L. J.,95,1295-1364.
  53. Parsons, Michael(2016).Clearing the Political Thicket: Why Political Gerrymandering forPartisan Advantage is Unconstitutional.WM.&MARY BILL RTS, J.,24,1107-1167.
  54. Pildes, Richard H.(2007).What Kind of Right is “The Right to Vote”?.VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF,93,45-52.
  55. Pushaw, Robert J., Jr(1996).Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach.CORNELL L. REV.,81,393-512.
  56. Raile, Richard B.(2018).Partisan Gerrymandering and Party Rights: Why Gill v. WhitfordUndermines All Future Partisan-Gerrymandering Claims.FEDERALIST SOC,19,110-121.
  57. Riddell, Will(2019).Partisan Gerrymandering and the First Amendment.WILLAMETTE L. REV.,55,395-419.
  58. Ross, Bertrall(2018).Partisan Gerrymandering, the First Amendment, and the Political Outsider.COLUM. L. REV.,118,2187-2218.
  59. Rubin, Edward L.(2020).Gerrymandering and Judicial Incapacity.WIS. L. REV.,2020,257-282.
  60. Ruley, James(2017).One Person, One Vote: Gerrymandering and the Independent Commission, A Global Perspective.IND. L. J.,92,783-816.
  61. Sample, James(2020).The Decade of Democracy’s Demise.AM. U. L. REV.,69,1559-1616.
  62. Scalia, Antonin(1983).The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers.SUFFOLK U. L. REV.,17,881-899.
  63. Semeraro, Steven(2017).Partisan Gerrymandering: Is There No Shame in It or Have PoliticiansBecome Shameless?.U. MEM. L. REV.,48,1-44.
  64. Shapiro, Carolyn(2020).Docket Control, Mandatory Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’sFailure in Rucho v. Common Cause.WIS. L. REV.,2020,301-316.
  65. Siegel, Jonathan R.(2007).A Theory of Justiciability.TEX. L. REV.,86,73-139.
  66. Spann, Girardeau A.(2020).Gerrymandering Justiciability.Geo. L. J.,108,981-1025.
  67. Stephanopoulos, Nicholas O.(2019).The Dance of Partisanship and Districting.HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.,13,507-537.
  68. Tokaji, Daniel P.(2018).Gerrymandering and Association.MARY L. REV.,59,2159-2209.
  69. Wang, Samuel S.,Ober, Richard F., Jr.,Williams, Ben(2019).Laboratories of DemocracyReform: State Constitutions and Partisan Gerrymandering.U. PA. J. CONST. L.,22,203-258.
  70. Weaver, Michael(2005).Uncertainty Maintained: The Split Decision over Partisan Gerrymandersin Vieth v. Jubelirer.LOY. U. CHI. L. J.,36,1273-1335.
  71. Wechsler, Herbert(1959).Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law.HARV. L. REV.,73,1-35.
  72. Weeden, L. Darnell(2020).Freedom of Association, Extreme Partisan Gerrymandering, Justiciability and the Unmistakable Political Question Controversy.BYU J. PUB. L.,34,75-108.
  73. Wender, Kevin(2020).The “Whip Hand”: Congress’s Elections Clause Power as the Last Hopefor Redistricting Reform After Rucho.FORDHAM L. REV.,88,2085-2110.
  74. Wilson, Megan(2018).Rethinking How Voters Challenge Gerrymandering: Congress, Courts,and State Constitutions.LOY. L. A. L. REV.,52,63-92.
  75. Winkler, Adam(1993).Expressive Voting.N. Y. U. L. REV.,68,303-383.
  76. 李念祖(2008)。權力分立制度之違憲審查基準初探─我國與美國案例之對照觀察。憲政時代，34(1)，41-95。
  77. 李建良(1997)。論司法審查的政治界限：美國「政治問題原則」初探。人文及社會集刊，9(4)，65-110。
  78. 李建良(2003).憲法理論與實踐（一）.學林.
  79. 東吳公法中心憲法小組[編](2018).憲法講義.元照.
  80. 林春元(2017)。司法審查、選舉制度與民主代表性－從司法院釋字第 721 號解釋談起。中研院法學期刊，20，155-210。
  81. 許育典(2021).憲法.元照.
  82. 許宗力(1999).憲法與法治國行政.元照.
  83. 陳淳文(1997)。由新近判例趨勢論法國公法上的「政府行為」概念。人文及社會集刊，9(4)，111-142。
  84. 陳淑芳(2009)。德國之選區劃分與司法審查。台灣法學雜誌，123，72-88。
  85. 陳慈陽(2014)。評司法院大法官釋字第 721 號解釋。台灣法學雜誌，254，59-76。
  86. 黃錦堂(2020).地方制度法論.元照.
  87. 楊承燁(2014)。由憲法平等選舉原則評析我國立法委員選舉制度。中研院法學期刊，15，311-400。
  88. 廖元豪(2004)。美國憲法釋義學對我國憲法解釋之影響—正當程序、政治問題與方法論之比較。憲政時代，30(1)，1-44。
  89. 廖元豪(2002)。從政治問題理論，論兩岸關係憲法定位之可司法性。政大法學評論，71，22-77。
  90. 劉宏恩(1995)。司法違憲審查與「政治問題」(Political Question)--大法官會議釋字三二八號評析。法律評論，61(1、2)，24-38。
  91. 蕭文生(2021).地方自治法—基礎理論與實務.元照.
print cancel