寡占廠商的目標選擇與數量競爭

Endogenous Objective and Quantity Competition in an Oligopoly Model

林瑞益(Ruey-Yih Lin)；孫嘉宏(Chia-Hung Sun)

內生廠商目標 ； 數量競爭 ； 利潤極大化 ； 收益極大化 ； Endogenous objectives ； Quantity competition ； Profit maximization ； Revenue maximization

東吳經濟商學學報

80期（2013 / 03 / 01）

1 - 25

繁體中文

本研究建立兩階段賽局模型，探討一般化寡占廠商的目標選擇與數量競爭。寡占廠商先在賽局第一階段同時決定其個別目標為追求「利潤極大化」或是追求「收益極大化」；在賽局第二階段，廠商依其目標同時決定其個別產量。在線性的需求與相同成本下，本研究得到以下結果：（1）市場規模的大小為賽局均衡之關鍵因素。如果市場規模夠大，則所有廠商都追求「收益極大化」；當市場規模較小時，則所有廠商都追求「利潤極大化」；如果市場規模適中，則部份廠商追求「利潤極大化」，而其餘廠商追求「收益極大化」，而且選擇追求「利潤極大化」廠商的產量與利潤，低於選擇追求「收益極大化」廠商的產量與利潤。（2）對於社會福利與消費者剩餘而言，所有廠商都選擇追求「收益極大化」時，社會福利與消費者剩餘最高，然而，對廠商而言，卻是一個囚犯兩難的均衡結果。

This paper investigates objective choice and quantity competition in a generalized oligopoly model. The model herein is a two-stage game. In the first stage, oligopoly firms simultaneously and independently choose their respective objective (either profit maximization or revenue maximization). Then, in the second stage, they compete in quantity according to their objective. With linear demand functions and linear production cost functions, the results are as follows: First, the market size plays a crucial role in equilibrium outcome. When the market size is large (small) enough, all firms choose the same objective to maximize their respective revenue (profit). When the market size is moderate, some firms choose profit maximization, while the remaining firms choose revenue maximization. And the profit of the firms choosing profit maximization will be less than that of the firms choosing revenue maximization. Second, when all firms choose revenue maximization, social welfare and consumer surplus are both maximized, while it is a prisoner's dilemma outcome.

1. Kaneda, M. and A. Mastui (2003), “Do profit maximizers maximize profit? Divergence of objective and result in oligopoly.” mimeo, University of Tokyo, available at http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/matsui/profit50.pdf.
2. Basu, K.(1995).Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives.Economics Letters,49(4),459-464.
3. Baumol, W.(1962).On the theory of the expansion of the firm.American Economic Review,52,1078-87.
4. Blinder, A. S.(1993).A simple note on the Japanese firm.Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,7(3),238-255.
5. Fershtman, C.,Judd, K. L.(1987).Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly.American Economic Review,77(5),927-940.
6. Jansen, T.,Van Lier, A.,Van Witteloostuijn, A.(2007).A note on strategic delegation: the market share case.International Journal of Industrial Organization,25(3),531-539.
7. Leland, H. E.(1972).The dynamics of a revenue maximizing firm.International Economic Review,13(2),376-85.
8. Marris, R.(1963).A Model of the 'Managerial' Enterprise.Quarterly Journal of Economics,77(2),185-209.
9. Mavrommati, A.(2012).The dynamics of a revenue maximizing firm.Economics Bulletin,32(2),843-853.
10. Rtischev, D.(2012).Strategic commitment to pursue a goal other than profit in a Cournot duopoly.Gakushuin Economic Papers,49(2),133-142.
11. Schaffer, M. E.(1989).Are profit maximizers the best survivors?.Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,12(1),29-45.
12. Sklivas, S. D.(1987).The strategic choice of managerial incentives.RAND Journal of Economics,18(3),452-458.
13. Tabeta, N.,Wang, R.(1996).SABRE Working Papers SeriesSABRE Working Papers Series,未出版
14. Tabeta, N.,Wang, R.(1996).SABRE Working Papers SeriesSABRE Working Papers Series,未出版
15. Vickers, J.(1985).Delegation and the theory of the firm.Economic Journal,95,138-147.
16. Williamson, J.(1966).Profit, growth, and sales maximization.Economica,33(129),1-16.
17. 李禮仲、鄧哲偉(2002)。財團法人國家政策研究中心國政分析財團法人國家政策研究中心國政分析,未出版
18. 高孔廉、劉德照(1990)。企業目標優先順序之比較研究。管理評論，9，195-209。
19. 葉匡時、黃振聰、劉韻僖、彭信衡(1996)。公司上市的原因與上市過程的組織變革。管理評論，15，15-36。