誘因排擠與社區保育集體行動臺灣東部兩個案例之比較研究

Incentive Crowding-out and Community-based Conservation a Comparative Study of Two Cases in Eastern Taiwan

10.6161/jgs.2009.56.02

莊武龍(Wu-Long Jhuang)；戴興盛(Hsing-Sheng Tai)

溪流保育 ； 排擠效果 ； 經濟誘因 ； 共有資源 ； river conservation ； crowding-out effect ； economic incentive ； common-pool resources

地理學報

56期（2009 / 08 / 01）

17 - 38

繁體中文

本文的目的爲，研究使用經濟誘因於社區保育中所導致的誘因排擠現象，並分析這個現象對社區保育集體行動的影響。本文以臺灣東部兩個社區保育個案爲例進行比較分析，探討誘因排擠現象的發生原因與其動態發展過程。比較研究發現，誘因排擠現象的確存在，其主因爲，經濟利益引發了顯著的社區內尋租活動與菁英掠奪現象，因而排擠了居民參與集體行動的社會性與規範性動機，並對保育集體行動造成了負面的衝擊。這意涵著，經濟性誘因的效果雖不至於被全盤否認，但它的確不像先前人們所假設的那麼有效，因爲它的效果可能會部分地甚或全部地被誘因排擠現象所抵銷。本研究也發現，大量快速的外部經濟資源，或大量快速的內部經濟發展所帶來的經濟利益，這種類型的經濟誘因，所可能引致的誘因排擠效果特別強烈。我們因此建議，推動社區保育的相關外部機構，應避免在短時期間內提供大量的經濟資源給予地方社區。

This paper aims to study the use of economic incentive in community-based conservation, and the subsequent crowding-out effect. It also analyses the impact of crowding-out effect on collective action at the community level. With a comparative study of two cases in Eastern Taiwan, we investigate why crowding-out effect arises and how it evolves. The comparative study shows that crowding-out effect does exist. The main cause for this effect is that: economic interests generally induce intra-community rent-seeking and elite-capture activities, thereby crowding out the social and normative motives of community members for participating collective action, which in turn deters the will to collective conservation action. This finding demonstrates that economic incentive is not so effective as expected in inducing and sustaining collective action, since its positive effect on collective action can be partly, if not totally, offset by the crowding-out effect. The study also finds out that a substantial amount of economic interests, whether offered rapidly by external institutions or driven by internal economic development, can cause serious crowding-out effect. We accordingly suggest that external institutions should avoid offering substantial amount of economic resources for local communities in a relatively short-term period.

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