题名

CEO Pay-for-performance Relation: Asymmetric or Symmetric?

并列篇名

執行長薪酬與績效關係：對稱或不對稱關係？

DOI

10.3966/054696002018060103001

作者

郭啟賢(Chii-Shyan Kuo)；余士迪(Shih-Ti Yu)

关键词

CEO Compensation ； Quantile Regression ； Pay-for-performance Relation ； 執行長薪酬 ； 分量迴歸法 ； 薪酬績效關係

期刊名称

應用經濟論叢

卷期/出版年月

103期（2018 / 06 / 01）

页次

1 - 44

内容语文

英文
中文摘要

The optimal contacting theory suggests a symmetric relation between CEO pay and firm performance. That is, CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity should remain relatively constant regardless of whether a firm performs good or bad. However, the extant empirical evidence on this issue still reveals lack of consensus. We argue that several factors may increase the heterogeneity of pay-for-performance sensitivity. In this study, we adopt an innovative approach, quantile regression to reexamine how CEO pay-performance sensitivities vary across different levels of CEO pay. We find that conditionally high-CEO equity holding and CEO total pay have a stronger pay-for-performance relation than conditionally low-CEO equity holding and CEO total pay. This suggests that OLS (ordinary least square) may not be an optimal solution to examine this relation. Since the OLS estimate of pay-for-performance sensitivity mainly focuses on the mean relation, and therefore the conclusion based on OLS could be misleading. Additional analyses suggest that large-sized firms demonstrates incremental positive effects of stock return on CEO equity holding. This incremental positive impact of stock return on CEO pay is more pronounced when CEO total pay is used. This could be driven by the fact that pay package for CEOs of small-sized firms comprises a greater portion of cash compensation, attenuating the pay-for-performance sensitivity, and therefore broadening the difference in pay-for-performance between large- and small-sized firms.
英文摘要

薪酬合約理論預期執行長薪酬與公司績效應呈「對稱」關係。亦即績效好(差)時，薪酬應調昇(調減)。但結論目前仍告分歧。我們認為某些因素使得薪酬績效關係，會隨著薪酬水準不同而發生改變。過去文獻著重薪酬績效間之平均關係，因而忽略此關係存在異質性。本研究採分量迴歸來探討此可能性。我們發現就薪酬水準較高(低)之執行長而言，其薪酬績效敏感度較高(低)。此結果顯示執行長薪酬與績效存有不對稱關係。
主题分类 基礎與應用科學 > 永續發展研究
生物農學 > 農業
生物農學 > 森林
生物農學 > 畜牧
生物農學 > 漁業
社會科學 > 經濟學
社會科學 > 財金及會計學
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