题名 |
存有與自由問題-海德格對康德自由觀的探討與批判 |
并列篇名 |
Being and Freedom-Heidegger's Comments on and Critiques of Kant's View of Freedom |
DOI |
10.29732/SJPS.200408.0005 |
作者 |
孫雲平(Yun-Ping Sun) |
关键词 |
海德格 ; 康德 ; 自由 ; 因果性 ; 存有 ; Heidegger ; Kant ; Freedom Freiheit ; Causality Kausalität ; Being |
期刊名称 |
東吳哲學學報 |
卷期/出版年月 |
10期(2004 / 08 / 01) |
页次 |
145 - 177 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
海德格對自由的觀點,受到他對康德及謝林自由問題探討的影響而形成。本文僅就其對康德自由觀的評注與批判進行探討。首先,海德格探討了消極與積極的自由、及其涉及的範圍,以確定自由問題確實是一個哲學的問題。其次,海德格分析了康德在理論哲學的論域中,將自由視為宇宙論之因果性法則的一種特殊情況;這種觀點壓抑了人的特殊存在。康德在實踐哲學的論述中,將自由僅視為人類實踐理性的自我立法;這種觀點割裂了自由問題和形上學問題的關聯性。最後,海德格從對康德自由觀的批判,提出他自身對自由問題的觀點;以確定自由問題同時是根本的形上學問題。 |
英文摘要 |
Heidegger developed his view of freedom via discussing Kant's and Schelling's view of it. This paper describes Heidegger's view of freedom via his critique of Kant. Heidegger first proposed two kinds of freedom, negative and positive, to ensure the proper range and character of freedom, then pointed out that Kant regarded freedom as a case within natural causality (in theoretical philosophy), to bypass if not repress the unique existence of human being. On the other hand, Kant restricted freedom to self-legislation of practical reason (in practical philosophy), to sever freedom from metaphysics. Finally, Heidegger insists that freedom should be in the metaphysical realm, not just in natural and moral realms. Heidegger thus proposed his own more broad view of freedom via critiques of Kant. Heidegger takes freedom as something ontological, more basic and comprehensive than what Kant envisaged. |
主题分类 |
人文學 >
人文學綜合 |
参考文献 |
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被引用次数 |
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