大量模組假設與佛德的先驗論證

Massive Modularity Hypothesis and Fodor's a Priori Argument

10.29732/SJPS.200608.0001

陳俊明(Chun-Ming Chen)

大量模組假設 ； 心靈模組 ； 中央運程 ； 騙徒偵測模組 ； 論域特定 ； 跨論域式 ； Massive Modularity Hypothesis ； modularity ； central processing ； cheater-detection module ； domain specific ； domain general

東吳哲學學報

14期（2006 / 08 / 01）

1 - 23

繁體中文

本文探討演化心理學家所主張並辯護的「大量模組假設」，以及佛德的批評。根據演化心理學家的看法，人類心靈是一組為了解決適應問題，經天擇機制產生的資訊處理器。演化心理學家提出的「大量模組假設」，主張心靈是由大量天生的、特殊目的的計算機制，亦即「模組」，所組成的（達爾文式模組）。根據大量模組假設，心靈認知結構包括了周邊系統與中央運程，全部（或絕大部份）都是論域特定的模組化結構。因此，中央運程有所謂的「中央模組」（或概念模組）。然而此一假設與佛德的模組化主張相對立。佛德認為負責概念產生、信念形成、作推論與決策的中央運程是非模組化、跨論域式的結構。他並提出一先驗論證批評大量模組假設面臨「輸入問題」。 本文指出，儘管佛德的論證指出中央系統有跨論域式的運程或機制，他的論證並沒有批評到演化心理學家所主張的中央運程本身是跨論域式的。本文討論演化心理學家用以支持達爾文式模組的經驗證據與理論，尤其是他們所提的「騙徒偵測機制」，用以說明人類在進行義務條件推論時的認知運作。藉由此討論，本文指出佛德的論證並未成功反駁大量模組假設。

This paper was about the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH) and Fodor's a priori objection to it. Evolutionary psychologists develop and defend the MMH, arguing that the mind is a set of information-processing mechanisms that were selected for to solve adaptive problems our hunter-gatherer ancestors faced. According to this hypothesis, our cognitive architecture, including the part that subserves central processing, is largely or perhaps even entirely composed of modules, computational mechanisms that are innate and domain-specific. This hypothesis, however, seems to run counter to Fodor's idea of modularity. Fodor argues that central mechanisms such as concept forming, belief fixation, reasoning, and decision making are non-modular and domain general. He gives an a priori argument pointing out that the MMH faces an ”input problem.” I argued in this paper that although Fodor's argument may have established the idea that there are inevitably non-modular central mechanisms, he has not shown that the sort of central mechanisms evolutionary psychologists have proposed is non-modular and domain general. My discussion was mainly on the empirical evidence and theories evolutionary psychologists have for their Darwinian modules, in particular, the cheater-detection mechanisms in use in solving the deontic conditional reasoning problems people have often encountered in daily life. Fodor's argument does not succeed in rejecting the MMH.

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