Why Do We Need a Theory of Truth?

10.29732/SJPS.200608.0004

米建國(Chien-Kuo Mi)

真理理論 ； 真理 ； 戴維森 ； 塔斯基 ； theory of truth ； truth ； Davidson ； Tarski

東吳哲學學報

14期（2006 / 08 / 01）

93 - 125

英文

對於「什麼是真理」與「什麼是真理理論或真理理論的哲學意涵」的討論，一直是戴維森哲學中的重要主題，但在過去將近四十年的過程中，這些討論是隨著不同的問題背景而出現的。一開始當問及「什麼是意義的本質」和「一個意義理論究竟能做什麼」的問題時，「真理」被視為一個最基礎與原初的概念，因為戴維森巧妙的運用了塔斯基的真理理論，做為建構他自己的意義理論的基本架構。接下來當問題直接關連到「一個真理理論應該是什麼」和「究竟塔斯基的真理理論意味著什麼」時，戴維森表達並論證為什麼他拒絕接受一些真理理論（包括符應理論、融貫理論、實用理論與壓縮理論）的理由，並反駁一般對於塔斯基的真理理論所做的不當詮釋。最後，「真理」概念本身已變成戴維森最有興趣的兩個關懷重點之一（另一個是「客觀性」概念），其理由在於戴維森深知像塔斯基般的真理定義或分析並不能窮盡「真理」概念的內容，而戴維森也很想回答究竟「真理」概念是不是一個哲學上值得研究追尋的目標。 從一個戴維森式的觀點來看，與其詢問意義理論是一個針對什麼概念而發的理論，還不如詢問一個意義理論可以用來做什麼；同樣的道理，與其詢問真理理論是一個針對什麼概念而發的理論，還不如詢問一個真理理論可以用來做什麼。戴維森的意義理論並不是一個用來定義「意義」概念的理論，一個戴維森式的真理理論也不是一個用來定義「真理」概念的理論。 「真理」概念是十分根本與核心的概念，它是無法被定義的，也不能被還原到其他更清楚與更基本的概念上。戴維森的論證顯示出：符應理論、融貫理論與實用理論的錯誤都在於輸入了太多不必要的內容於「真理」概念之中，而壓縮理論則忽略與低估了「真理」概念在語言的瞭解中之重要角色。如果誠如戴維森所言，「企圖去定義真理概念是一件愚蠢的事情」，那麼，為什麼我們還需要一個真理論呢？我所要論證的是：我們也許不需要一個實質上在形上學層次為「真理」概念提供定義的真理理論，但我們確實需要一個語言學層次上的「真理理論」用來闡釋「意義」的概念，並彰顯「真理」與「信念」或其他有關意向性態度之間的緊密關連。這個哲學上深具意涵的真理理論，一方面可以從類似像塔斯基般的真理論中推演出來，另一方面也可以透過一種相近於理性決策理論之方式予以建構出來。

Over the years, the discussions of what the concept of truth is, and of what a theory of truth can do or ought to be, have always been the important in Davidson's philosophy, but they have been so for different reasons and relative to different questions. At the beginning, when the question was asked about what the nature (or the meaning) of meaning is or what a theory of meaning is supposed to do, the concept of truth was fundamental as well as primitive because the Tarski-style theory of truth had to be implemented in order to accomplish Davidson's ingenious design for constructing his theory of meaning. Then, when the question was directly related to the concern with what a theory of truth ought to be or what Tarski's theory of truth amounts to, Davidson argued for that we should reject attempts to provide a ”right” or ”substantial” theory for the concept of truth, or to offer the so-called correct characterization of Tarski's view of truth. Finally, the concept of truth itself became one of Davidson's two main interests (the other one was ”objectivity”), because he was aware that Tarski's style truth definitions or theories didn't really exhaust the content of the concept of truth, and he wanted to answer the question as to whether truth is a goal of inquiry. From a Davidsonian point of view, instead of asking what a theory of meaning is a theory of, it is more appropriate to ask what a theory of meaning is a theory for. It seems as well to ask what a theory of truth is a theory for fits Davidson's philosophy far better than asking what a theory of truth is a theory of. Davidson's theory of meaning is not a theory for defining the general concept of meaning, neither is a theory of truth in Davidsonian style a theory for defining the general concept of truth. The concept of truth is essential and central, but it is not definable and cannot be reduced to other concepts that are simpler, clearer, or more basic. Davidson's arguments show that while correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories inflate or pump too much unnecessary content into the concept of truth, deflationary theories ignore or underestimate its important role in our understanding of natural language. If, as Davidson claims, ”it is folly to try to define the concept of truth”, either in an explicit or in an implicit way, why do we still need a theory of truth? I want to argue that we may not need any theory of truth on the metaphysical level, but we do need a theory of truth on the linguistic level-that is, the language-involving level on which truth can explicate the concept of meaning, and has intimate connection with belief or other intentional attitudes. This useful theory of truth will be brought out by exploring a theory of truth based on Tarski's style and a theory of rational decision as developed by Ramsey's version of Bayesian decision theory.

1. Alston, William(1996).A Realist Conception of Truth.Cornell University Press.
2. Blackburn, S.,Simmons, K.(1999).Truth.Oxford:Oxford University Press.
3. Davidson, Donald(1984).Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation.Oxford:Clarendon Press.
4. Davidson, Donald(2001).Subjective, Intersubjective and Objective.Oxford:Clarendon Press.
5. Davidson, Donald(1990).The Structure and Content of Truth.Journal of Philosophy,87,279-328.
6. Davidson, Donald(1996).The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Journal of Philosophy,93,263-278.
7. Davidson, Donald,Brandom, Robert B. (ed.)(2000).Rorty and His Critics.Cambridge:Blackwell.
8. Davidson, Donald,Davidson(1987).Afterthoughts.
9. Davidson, Donald,Davidson(1967).Truth and Meaning.
10. Davidson, Donald,Davidson(1983).A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.
11. Davidson, Donald,Davidson(1988).Epistemology and Truth.
12. Davidson, Donald,Hahn(1999).Intellectual Autobiography.
13. Davidson, Donald,Peregrin(1999).The Centrality of Truth.
14. Devitt, Michael,Lynch(2001).The Metaphysics of Truth.
15. Etchemendy, J.(1988).Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence.Journal of Symbolic Logic,53
16. Field, Hartry(1972).Tarski`s Theory of Truth.Journal of Philosophy,69(13),347-375.
17. Frege, G.(1918).The Frege Reader.Blackwell:Michael Beaney.
18. Grover, D.,Campand, Jr. J.,Belnap, Jr. N.(1975).A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Philosophical Studies,27
19. Hahn, Lewis(1999).The Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Open Court Publishing Co..
20. Horwich, Paul(1994).Theories of Truth.Dartmouth Publishing Company.
21. Horwich, Paul(1998).Truth.Oxford:Oxford University Press.
22. Kirkham, R.(1992).Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction.Cambridge:MIT.
23. Leeds, S.(1978).Erkenntnis.
24. Lynch, Michael(2001).The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives.Cambridge:MIT.
25. Peregrin, J.(1999).Truth and its Nature (If Any).Kluwer Academic Publishers.
26. Popper, Karl(1968).Logic of Scientific Discovery.New York:Basic Books.
27. Quine, W. V.(1960).Word and Object.Cambridge:MIT.
28. Ramsey, Frank(1990).The Nature of Truth.Episteme,16,6-16.
29. Soames, Scott(1984).What Is a Theory of Truth?.Journal of Philosophy,81,411-429.
30. Tarski, Alfred(1944).The Semantic Conception of Truth.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,Ⅳ,342-360.
31. Tarski, Alfred,J. H. Woodger(tr.),J Corcoran, Hackett(ed.)(1983).Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.
32. Williams, Michael(1986).Do We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth?.Philosophical Topics,14,223-242.
33. 米建國(2002)。戴維森的意義整體論。國立政治大學哲學學報，8，33-68。

1. (2024)。倫理決策評準探討：一貫論與一致論之對立與融合。應用倫理評論，76，105-136。