規範道德理論的結構－論卡根的區分法

The Structure of Normative Ethics-On Shelly Kagan's Taxonomy

10.29732/SJPS.201102.0004

郭柏年(Pak-Nin Kwok)

卡根 ； 後果論 ； 義務論 ； 德性倫理 ； 規範倫理學 ； Shelly Kagan ； Consequentialism ； Deontology ； Virtue Ethics ； Normative Ethics

東吳哲學學報

23期（2011 / 02 / 01）

81 - 107

繁體中文

現代倫理學界習慣把後果論，義務論和德性倫理三者視為立場迥異，互不相容的規範道德理論。對於這種觀點，卡根曾提出一套分析規範道德理論的方法回應。據此法所言，後果論，義務論和德性倫理其實各自針對不同的問題，原則上可以並行不悖。本文旨在批評此說，並由此旁及規範道德理論的結構問題。文章首部份先簡要說明卡根的理論的基本結構，並嘗試修正當中的漏洞。後半部份將論證其理論為何未能證成「三種道德理論可以兼容」此論旨，進而就規範道德理論的區分方法提出意見。

Contemporary normative theories of ethics are often divided into three categories, namely the consequentialist theories, the deontological theories, and virtue ethics. For many, this trichotomy naturally suggests that the three categories of theories are totally incompatible. Based on his proposal of a new taxonomy of normative ethics, however, Shelly Kagan rejects this very suggestion. His stance is that, in principle, the three ethical theories are completely compatible, only that they address three different concerns in normative ethics. The present paper aims to show that Kagan's taxonomy cannot justify the compatible thesis, and to provide some remarks on the structure of normative ethical theory. The paper is divided into two parts. Part Ⅰ offers a critical introduction to Shelly Kagan's classification scheme and other related issues. Part Ⅱ proceeds to argue why the compatible thesis which rest on Kagan's taxonomy cannot be retained. On the basis of these discussions, the paper ends with some suggestions on the problem of classification of normative ethical theory.

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