傾向條件句分析理論之困難與可能解決方案

The Problems for the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and a Possible Solution

蕭銘源(Ming-Yuan Hsiao)

傾向 ； 條件句分析 ； 反事實條件句 ； 條件句論 ； disposition ； conditional analysis ； counterfactual conditional ； conditional analysis of dispositions (CAD)

東吳哲學學報

27期（2013 / 02 / 01）

105 - 139

繁體中文

「傾向的條件句論」是考量傾向的一個主要立場，這個理論使用了反事實條件句來分析傾向。支持條件句論的學者宣稱，條件句論在直覺上符合日常語言中人們對傾向的使用方式，並且在存有學上是精簡的。但在文獻中，條件句論受到許多反例的挑戰，因而不令人滿意。許多學者認為，這些反例的出現，源於反事實條件句的某些邏輯特徵，因此，任何企圖使用反事實條件句去分析傾向的理論都無法避免反例的出現。本文的主要目的在於，從邏輯的面向來釐清反例對條件句論所造成的挑戰，並在這個基礎上，嘗試給出一個可能成功的傾向條件句分析理論。

The conditional analysis of dispositions (CAD) is a major position to analyze dispositions, in which counterfactual conditionals are used. The advocates of CAD indicate that CAD is an intuitively correct way to capture our common sense understanding of dispositions, along with its simplicity in ontology. However, according to recent research, CAD is shown unsatisfactory because it is challenged by many counterexamples. Many philosophers take that the counterexamples of CAD arise from the logical characteristics of counterfactual conditionals, so any theory which attempts to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze dispositions cannot get rid of the counterexamples. This paper aims to characterize how the counterexamples challenge CAD from the logical perspective, and tries to propose a possible solution.

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1. 蕭銘源(2019)。新傾向論與內在遮蓋者難題。國立臺灣大學哲學論評，57，49-76。
2. 蕭銘源(2021)。可被內在遮蓋的傾向與其存有學問題。東吳哲學學報，44，1-28。
3. (2022)。實踐知識傾向論與其困難。政治大學哲學學報，48，79-116。