理由整體主義與預設值理由

Holism of Reason and Default Reason

祖旭華(Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu)

理由整體主義 ； 預設值理由 ； 自然律 ； 異質性推理 ； holism of reason ； default reason ； laws of nature ； non-monotonic reasoning

東吳哲學學報

31期（2015 / 02 / 01）

59 - 91

繁體中文

理由整體主義（holism of reason）與預設值理由（default reason）這兩個概念間的關係近來廣受討論，因為它們似乎分別都具有直覺上的吸引力，但是卻似乎又彼此在邏輯上不相容，這十分令人困惑。我們要如何解決這個悖論呢？Jonathan Dancy採取一種相容論的主張，將預設值理由理解成預設值理由，進而論證理由整體主義與預設值理由相容，筆者將論證他的方案行不通，因為他關於預設值理由的論述不成立。筆者將提出自己的解悖方案，概略上來說，筆者認為有兩種可能的解決方式，其一是採取相容論的主張，將預設值理由理解為知識論上而非形而上的主張，因此可避免與做為形而上主張的理由整體主義相衝突。其二是採取不相容論的主張，放棄預設值理由的概念，並說明為何我們直覺上會錯誤地認為理由具有預設值。筆者將論證這兩種解決方式都是合理的，因此我們不應該對於悖論的解決感到絕望。

The ideas of reason holism and default reason are respectively intuitively plausible. However, on closer examination, they seem to be incompatible with each other. Dancy proposed to solve this paradox by construing the concept of default reason as default reason. The concept of default reason is problematic, however, or so I will argue. So Dancy's proposal does not work. In this paper, I propose two possible ways to resolve the paradox. One is to construe the idea of default reason as an epistemological one so as to circumvent confrontation with the idea of reason holism. The other is to give up on the idea of default reason and explain why it has seemed so intuitive to most of us while it is in fact erroneous. I shall argue that these two solutions are plausible so we should not feel despaired of the paradox.

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