亞里斯多德論知覺：物質論或精神論？

Aristotle on Perception: Materialism or Spiritualism?

王志輝(Zhi-Hue Wang)

知覺 ； 物質論 ； 精神論 ； 潛能 ； 實現 ； perception ； materialism ； spiritualism ； dunamis ； energeia

東吳哲學學報

32期（2015 / 08 / 01）

37 - 86

繁體中文

在近數十年來，有關亞里斯多德知覺理論的研究，環繞在一個關鍵爭議上。R. Sorabji認為，根據亞里斯多德，知覺乃是建立在某種「典型變化」的基礎上，亦即當我們在知覺時，知覺器官乃是如實地接受知覺形式、物理性地歷經的性質變動，例如在看到紅色時，我們的眼球也必須變成紅色。反之，M. Burnyeat則援引Aquinas的亞里斯多德知覺理論詮釋，認為知覺乃是一種純粹「精神性的變化」；這種精神性的變化，Burnyeat認為，與器官典型的性質變化一點關係都沒有，也無須底層的物理或材質變化為其生理基礎；因為我們當知覺時，知覺器官僅是覺察到知覺形式，而非物理上如實地接受它們。針對這個爭議，本文試圖採取一種折衷的詮釋立場。本文並不認為，知覺活動等同於或承載在知覺器官的典型性質變化之上。然而，本文亦不認為，知覺活動與器官之生理或物理變化絲毫無關，如Burnyeat所設想的那樣。延續近年來流行的「編碼說」的詮釋立場，本文嘗試論證，在知覺活動中，知覺器官雖未歷經典型的性質變化，但它仍然歷經某種材質性的變動，而知覺形式則正是被「編碼」在這種變動之中。然而，相較於近年流行的各種「編碼說」立場多半忽略了，被編碼的變動仍然是某種材質性或生理性的變動這個事實，也未注意到這個事實對亞里斯多德整體知覺理論乃是某種潛在的威脅，本文嘗試指出，亞里斯多德的「知覺作為中道」說法，恰好可解決這個困難。

In recent decades, scholarly researches on Aristotle's theory of perception focused on a central debate concerning the role which the physiological process plays in perception. On the one hand, R. Sorabji claimed that perceiving, on Aristotle's view, involves a physiological process in which the sense-organ literally takes on the perceptible quality of the object. That is, perception has the ＂standard alteration＂ (change of quality) of the sense-organ as its physiological basis. For example, when we see a red apple, the organ of sight (the eye-jelly) should be physically turning into red. In contrast, M. Burnyeat suggested that perception is purely a ＂spiritual change＂ (to use Aquinas' term), which has nothing to do with the standard alteration suggested by Sorabji. Moreover, Burnyeat insisted that there is definitely no physiological or material change taking place during perception, because perceiving, as a pure spiritual activity, does not require any underlying material process as its physiological basis. Hence, on Burnyeat's reading, the physiological process has no role to play in perception. This article attempts to find a proper balance between these two radically contrasting interpretations. First, I will show that there is no clear evidence in Aristotle's text to claim that the physiological process involved in perceiving is the organ's literally taking on the perceptible form, as Sorabji suggested. Second, I will prove that Burnyeat's position is not totally persuasive either. For it is not the case that perception has nothing to do with any physiological or material process taking place in the sense-organ. Following the interpreting line recently suggested by several structuralist approaches, I try to argue that although the sense-organ does not bear a standard change of quality during perception, it is nevertheless affected by an ＂encoded＂ movement induced by a likewise encoded movement of the medium. In this way, the sense-organ will receive only a coded message, without really exemplifying the perceived quality. However, since the organ's reception of the coded message is still supposed to be a physiological change, it would be very difficult to explain how perceiving can be grounded in such a process; for one of the main theses in Aristotle's theory of perception is that perceiving is an ＂activity＂ (energeia), which should not be constructed by any physiological or material change whatsoever underlying it. This dilemma, I think, can be evaded by appealing to a famous proverb in De Anima that ＂perception is a mean.＂

1. Aristotle (1937). De Partibus Animalium (A. L. Peck, Ed. & Trans.). Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.(Abbr. PA)
2. Philoponus, J. (1897). Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis de anima libros commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 15) (M. Hayduck, Ed.). Berlin: Reimer
3. Aristotle (1949). Categoriae (L. Minio-Paluello, Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press(Abbr. Cat.)
4. Aristotle (1894). Ethica Nicomachea (L. Bywater, Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press(Abbr. EN)
5. Aristotle (1942). De Generatione Animalium, (A. L. Peck, Ed. & Trans.). Massachusetts: Harvard University Press(Abbr. GA)
6. Aquinas, T.,Foster, K.(Trans.),Humphries, S.(Trans.)(1994).Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima.Notre Dame, Indiana:Dumb Ox Books.
7. Aristotle,Forster, E. S.(Ed. Trans.)(1955).De Generatione et Corruptione.Massachusetts:Harvard University Press.
8. Aristotle,Jaeger, W.(Ed.)(1957).Metaphysica.Oxford:Oxford University Press.
9. Aristotle,Ross, D.(Ed.)(1955).De Sensu et Sensibilibus, Parva Naturalia.Oxford:Clarendon Press.
10. Aristotle,Ross, W. D.(Ed.)(1956).De Anima.Oxford:Oxford University Press.
11. Aristotle,Ross, W. D.(Ed.)(1950).Physica.Oxford:Oxford University Press.
12. Barker, A.(1981).Aristotle on Perception and Ratios.Phronesis,26,248-266.
13. Barnes, J.(Ed.),Schofield, M.(Ed.),Sorabji, R.(Ed.)(1979).Articles on Aristotle 4: Psychology and Aesthetics.London:Duckworth.
14. Bernard, W.(1988).Rezeptivität und Spontaneität der Wahrnehmung bei Aristoteles. Versuch einer Bestimmung der spontanen Erkenntnisleistung der Wahrnehmung bei Aristoteles in Abgrenzung gegen die rezeptive Auslegung der Sinnlichkeit bei Descartes und Kant.Baden-Baden:Koerner.
15. Bradshaw, D.(1997).Aristotle on Perception: The Dual-Logos Theory.Apeiron,30,143-161.
16. Brennan, S. O.(1973).Sensing and the Sensitive Mean in Aristotle.The New Scholasticism,47,279-310.
17. Broadie, S.(1993).Aristotle's Perceptual Realism.The Southern Journal of Philosophy,31(supplement 1),137-159.
18. Burnyeat, M. F.(2002).De Anima II 5.Phronesis,47,28-90.
19. Burnyeat, M. F.(2001).Aquinas on "Spiritual Change" in Perception.Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality,Leiden:
20. Bynum, T. W.(1987).A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception.History of Philosophy Quarterly,4,163-178.
21. Caston, V.(1998).Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,58,249-298.
22. Cohen, S. M.(1987).The Credibility of Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind.Aristotle Today: Essays on Aristotle's Ideal of Science,Edmonton:
23. Ebert, T.(1983).Aristotle on What is Done in Perceiving.Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,37,181-198.
24. Everson, S.(1997).Aristotle on Perception.Oxford:Clarendon Press.
25. Glidden, D.(1984).Aristotelian Perception and the Hellenistic Problem of Representation.Ancient Philosophy,4,119-131.
26. Gregoric, P.(2007).Aristotle on the Common Sense.Oxford:Oxford University Press.
27. Hamlyn, D. W.(Trans.)(1993).Aristotle's De Anima Books II and III (with Passages from Book I).Oxford:Clarendon Press.
28. Heinaman, R.(1990).Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem.Phronesis,35,83-102.
29. Johansen, T. K.(1997).Aristotle on the Sense-Organs.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
30. Kosman, L. A.(1984).Substance, Being and Energeia.Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,2,121-149.
31. Lear, J.(1988).Aristotle: The Desire to Understand.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
32. Magee, J. M.(2000).Sense Organs and the Activity of Sensation in Aristotle.Phronesis,45,306-330.
33. Makin, S.(2006).Aristotle's Metaphysics Book Θ.Oxford:Clarendon Press.
34. Miller, F. D., Jr.(1999).Aristotle's Philosophy of Perception.Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy,15,177-213.
35. Modrak, D.(1987).Aristotle. The Power of Perception.Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
36. Nussbaum, M. C.(Ed.),Rorty, A. O.(Ed.)(1995).Essays on Aristotle's De Anima.Oxford:Clarendon Press.
37. Owens, J.(1980).Form and Cognition in Aristotle.Ancient Philosophy,1,17-27.
38. Polansky, R.(2007).Aristotle's De anima.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.
39. Polansky, R.(1992).Energeia in Aristotle's Metaphysics IX.Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy 5: Aristotle's Ontology,Albany, NY:
40. Robinson, H. M.(1978).Mind and Body in Aristotle.The Classical Quarterly,28,105-124.
41. Salles, R.(Ed.)(2005).Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji.Oxford:Clarendon Press.
42. Scaltsas, T.(1994).Substance and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics.Ithaca:Cornell University Press.
43. Shields, C.(1988).Soul and Body in Aristotle.Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,6,103-137.
44. Silverman, A.(1989).Color and Color-Perception in Aristotle's De anima.Ancient Philosophy,9,271-292.
45. Sisko, J. E.(1996).Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle's De Anima.Phronesis,41,138-157.
46. Slakey, T.(1961).Aristotle on Sense Perception.Philosophical Review,70,470-484.
47. Sorabji, R.(1991).From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality.Aristotle and the Later Tradition,Oxford:
48. Sorabji, R.(2001).Aristotle on Sensory Process and Intentionality.Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality,Leiden:
49. Tweedale, M. M.(1992).Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation Is an Immaterial Reception of a Form.Philosophical Topics,20,215-231.
50. Ward, J. K.(1988).Perception and Λόγος in De anima ii 12.Ancient Philosophy,8,217-234.

1. 陳斐婷(2017)。空氣如何容受顏色？─亞里斯多德論中介物、光、與視覺。國立臺灣大學哲學論評，54，83-128。
2. (2018)。亞里斯多德論構想力。東吳政治學報，40，47-96。