题名

可被內在遮蓋的傾向與其存有學問題

并列篇名

Intrinsically Finkable Disposition and Its Ontological Problems

作者

蕭銘源(Ming-Yuan Hsiao)

关键词

傾向 ； 傾向歸屬 ； 內在遮蓋者 ； 因果說明 ； 存有學無限膨脹 ； dispositions ； the ascription of dispositions ； intrinsic finks ； causal explanation ； the problem of ontological inflation

期刊名称

東吳哲學學報

卷期/出版年月

44期（2021 / 08 / 01）

页次

1 - 28

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

「是否有可被內在地遮蓋的傾向（intrinsically finkable disposition, IFD）？」是近年傾向研究的重要議題，主要理由在於：有沒有IFD會影響到傾向的歸屬，並進而決定某些傾向應用理論的成敗。文獻上，克拉克（Clarke, 2008, 2010）等學者主張有內在遮蓋者，但他們的論點被崔星豪（Choi, 2012, 2013）從三個面向所駁斥。而陶比（Tugby, 2016）則是從因果說明的面向來證成IFD，並以此提出歸屬IFD的原則來回應崔星豪。本文首先論證，基於陶比在建立IFD歸屬原則時假設了有爭議的因果觀點，他對IFD歸屬原則的論證將不再是決定性的。然後，筆者進一步論證，IFD支持者將因此面臨存有學無限膨脹的難題。
英文摘要

Could there be intrinsic finks for a disposition? Or, could there be any intrinsically finkable disposition (IFD)? These questions regarding intrinsic finks are important for the studies of dispositions because the adequacy of dispositional accounts of various notions depends on whether or not the dispositions in question can be intrinsically finked. In recent work, Clarke (2008, 2010) and Everett (2009) argue that some dispositions are intrinsically finkable. However, Choi (2012, 2013) raises three objections to this position. In order to respond to Choi's seemingly plausible objections, Tugby (2016) explicates the intuition that some particular cases are cases of IFD in terms of causal explanation, and further offers an ascription principle for IFD. In this paper, I argue that Tugby's argument for the ascription principle for IFD is not conclusive due to his debatable supposition of causality. Furthermore, I argue that the advocates of IFD encounter the problem of ontological inflation.
主题分类 人文學 > 人文學綜合
参考文献
  1. 蕭銘源(2019)。新傾向論與內在遮蓋者難題。國立臺灣大學哲學論評，57，49-76。
    連結：
  2. 蕭銘源(2013)。傾向條件句分析理論之困難與可能解決方案。東吳哲學學報，27，105-140。
    連結：
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