將從中御的困境－軍情傳遞與北宋神宗的軍事指揮

The Dilemma of Commanding Troops from the Capital: Intelligence Transmissions and Emperor Shenzong's Military Leadership

10.6253/ntuhistory.202006_(65).0001

方震華(Fang, Cheng-hua)

宋神宗 ； 宋夏戰爭 ； 訊息傳遞 ； 作戰指揮 ； Song Shenzong ； Tangut Xixia ； intelligence transmission ； military command

臺大歷史學報

65期（2020 / 06 / 01）

1 - 32

繁體中文

對中國古代君主而言，武力是維繫政權的基礎，在軍隊的控制上必須十分謹慎，即使無法「御駕親征」，也會積極介入軍事指揮。北宋建國後，太祖、太宗從京城指揮作戰的各種作為，形成「將從中御」的前例，後來的君主多所仿效。但是，由於京城與戰場往往距離遙遠，君主指揮作戰的企圖受到許多客觀因素限制，作戰訊息的取得尤為關鍵。本文以北宋後期最投入軍事事務的神宗為例，分析君主與前線將領之間如何進行訊息溝通，以呈現神宗企圖遙控戰場時面臨的困難。觀察神宗朝幾次對外戰爭的過程，可知由於訊息傳遞費時，一旦戰場與京城距離過遠，或是作戰持續的時間不長，神宗的意志即無法造成實質影響。在此情況下，神宗雖多次發動對外戰爭，唯有元豐四年（1081）「五路伐夏」之役最能夠展現神宗的指揮狀況。宋軍從當年四月開始備戰，到九月間出兵，神宗在整個過程中都力圖主導。但由於他過於自信，不重視朝廷官員與邊區將領的意見，又多次改變決策，造成作戰紊亂失序，也使宋軍面對未曾預期的困境。從軍情傳遞與指揮決策的角度來觀察，將能對宋代的軍事史有進一步的認知。

For ancient Chinese emperors, the control of military forces was crucial for maintaining their regimes. Even though at the time they were not able to command their troops in person, the emperors still tried to keep military actions under their supervision. After the Song Dynasty was established in 960, the first two emperors made huge efforts in directing their generals in the frontiers from the capital. These actions later became a tradition which later Song emperors tried to follow. To efficiently command military actions from the capital, however, the emperors faced some unresolved limitations. Most importantly, the distance between the capital and battlefields could significantly delay information communication, which caused the emperor to make decisions based on outdated reports. Under this circumstance, the commands from the emperors usually produced disorders among the troops. By analyzing the wars during Emperor Shenzong's reign (1067-1085), this article explores how the emperor's leadership influenced the performances of the Song troops. Overconfident regarding his own talents, Emperor Shenzong inclined to ignore the suggestions of his professional generals, and composed orders of military missions based on the information he received. Since he had never experienced real combat, the emperor's military plans were usually too optimistic to coincide with the real situations. This problem caused the generals on the battlefields to ignore the imperial orders, and figure out their own ways to survive the bloody fights. For this reason, even though Emperor Shenzong tried hard to command every war he initiated, the actual progress in the battlefields eventually went beyond his control.

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