作為先天綜合判斷的本質直觀是可能的嗎？－對石裹克、維根斯坦與胡塞爾之間爭論的追思

Is It Possible, the Wesensschau as Synthesis A priori? -A Reflection on the Conflicts between Schlick-Wittgenstein and Husserl

10.7065/MRPC.200602.0003

倪梁康(Liang-Kang Ni)

胡塞爾 ； 維根斯坦 ； 石裹克 ； 本質直觀 ； 觀念存在 ； 邏輯－經驗 ； 現象學 ； E. Husserl ； L. Wittgenstein ； M. Schlick ； ideation ； ideal being ； logical-empirical ； phenomenology

哲學與文化

33卷2期（2006 / 02 / 01）

3 - 22

繁體中文

二十世紀初，儘管存在著在哲學意向、哲學目標與風格、哲學論題與方法之間的一致性，在石裹克、維根斯坦與胡塞爾之間仍然發生過一場爭論、甚至可以說是直接的衝突：問題主要涉及對本質直觀的理解。它首先通過石裹克和胡塞爾之間的相互批評而表露出來，此後又在石裹克與維根斯坦的談話中得到繼續。本文首先是對此衝突的一個回顧，但本文的基本意圖並不僅僅在於對這個至此為止一直被忽略的歷史事實的發掘和再現－這只構成本文第一節的主題。而主要在於對爭論問題的重申與分析：什麼是觀念存在？什麼是對它的觀念直觀？－這是本文第二、三節的討論內容。儘管在第三節的結尾處已經給出了一個對胡塞爾與維根斯坦各自立場的小結，第四節仍然保持總結的形式，但眼光有所放開，一直擴展到對兩種時代精神的觀察上：觀念主義的和語言主義的。

At the beginning of the 20th. Century, although consistencies in regard to philosophical intention, aim, style, thesis and method, it has happened a controversy, indeed a conflict, between Schlick, Wittgenstein on the one side, and Husserl on the other side. The problem refers mostly to the understanding of Wesensschau (ideation). It first emerges from the mutual criticism between Schlick and Husserl, hereafter is continued in Schlick's and Wittgenstein's conversation. This text is firstly a review of this conflict, however, its basic intention lies not in to disinter and represent this always being neglected historical fact, which only constitutes the subject of the first section, but mainly in to reiterate and analyze the question: Whether the ideal being is possible? Whether the ideation of it is possible? This constitutes the contents of discussion in the second and third section. Although a brief account of Husserl's and Wittgenstein's standpoints has already been given at the end of the third section, the fourth section still maintains the form of summarizing, but the visual angle is expanded as far as possible to observe the both kinds of the Zeitgeist: the idealism and the lingualism.