論認識的“意向”－知識傳遞可能之探討

The "Intention" of Cognition-On the Possibility of Communicating Knowledge

10.7065/MRPC.200605.0101

李政達(Vence Jen Ta Lee)

意向 ； 認識 ； 抽向 ； 概念 ； 知識 ； 語言 ； 實在論 ； Intention ； Cognition ； Abstract ； Concept ； Knowledge ； Language ； Realism

哲學與文化

33卷5期（2006 / 05 / 01）

101 - 118

繁體中文

人類知識的傳遞依賴言語，言語乃一意義系統的組合與運用，而言語系統的基本元素依傳統哲學言，即是概念。概念乃作為知識傳遞之語言的內涵，然概念在士林哲學的理論中卻必然為普遍的。本文為了堅守士林哲學實在論的脈胳來探討知識傳遞的可能，故在討論順序上由「普遍概念」的說明開始。而由於普遍概念是透過理性抽象所得，因此在說明了普遍概念之後進而說明「士林哲學的抽象」。進一步由於多瑪斯(Aquinas, Thomas, 1224/5-1274)主張普遍概念乃是普遍意向，本文接著將討論引至「意向於認識的功能」問題之上。續之藉由意向的特性指出「普遍概念的存在方式」。在解釋了上述問題之後，再將問題導回言語於士林哲學的脈胳裡如何達致「知識傳遞的可能」。最後於文末以簡短的「小結」作為本文的結論。

The communication of knowledge relies on language. While language is the combinations and applications of a particular system of meanings, and the essential elements of language system are, as traditional philosophy calls, concept. Determined to explore the possibility of communicating knowledge in the context of scholastic realism, this article first explains ”universal concept.” Since universal concepts are the results of rational abstraction, after the explanation of universal concept, we are about to illustrate the ”abstractness of scholasticism.” Moreover, due to the fact that Thomas Aquinas claimed that universal concept was universal intentional, this article will discuss the ”functions of intention for cognition.” Then we will point out, via the features of intention, ”the ways of universal concept to exist.” After explaining the forementioned questions, the issue at stake will be re-directed back to how language achieves the ”possibility of communicating knowledge” in the context of scholasticism. At last, this article is finalized with ”the conclusion.”