馬里旦自然律之形上學與知識論基礎

The Metaphysical and Epistemological Foundations of Natural Law in Jacques Maritain

10.7065/MRPC.200609.0083

William Sweet；黃筱慧(Cristal Huang)

natural ； law ； moral ； synderesis ； Maritain

哲學與文化

33卷9期（2006 / 09 / 01）

83 - 98

繁體中文

Ethical theory today (at least in the English-speaking world) is dominated by utilitarianism and by deontological theories (which draw on the work of Kant). We also find, though to a much lesser extent, virtue ethics, feminist 'care' theories (e.g., from Carol Gilligan and Susan Sherwin), social contract theories, and rights-based theories. But often missing from the discussion-and from most ethics textbooks-is natural law theory. Natural law theory has a long history, starting with the Stoics. It is influential outside of the Anglo-American world (though, admittedly, less so than it once was), and it has its powerful defenders today (e.g., Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis). But nevertheless it is virtually absent from most contemporary studies in ethics and, even when it is mentioned, it is often quickly rejected. Why is this theory so widely ignored or rejected? There are a number of reasons that have been given. Some raise the problem of the distinction between 'is' and 'ought'-that is, that contrary to a basic claim of natural law theory, one cannot infer a moral statement of what one 'ought' to do from a descriptive statement of the kind of being one 'is.' Some attack the theory because it is a 'naturalistic' theory, and it commits (what the British philosopher G.E. Moore called) 'the naturalistic fallacy'-that moral properties (like 'good' or 'bad') are 'simple,' and cannot be defined in terms of something that is natural (such as ”happiness”. Some critics reject the theory of natural law because they hold that all laws are merely generalizations or conventions-and so there cannot be any universal moral laws. Others say that a natural law theory presupposes that there is a human nature-but that there is no reason to believe that there is any such thing. (Some existentialist philosophers, for example, hold that there is no human essence, and that our 'nature' is something we 'create' ourselves.) And there is today a widespread scepticism that questions whether there are such things as objective, universal moral standards-i.e., standards which apply to all human beings, regardless of the culture from which they come or the time in which they live. In any case, even if there are such standards, we might still ask Where do they come from? Can we know what they are? And can we be certain that they are legitimate? Many, if not most of these questions were, however, addressed by Jacques Maritain. In this paper, I want to outline Maritain's distinctive account of natural law and its metaphysical and epistemological dimensions. This account not only provides a more sophisticated understanding of natural law, but gives us good reason to challenge the marginalization of it in contemporary moral philosophy. The object of this short essay has been to present Jacques Maritain's account of natural law. For Maritain, the 'natural law' is ”an order or a disposition that the human reason can discover and according to which the human will must act in order to be in accord with the essential and necessary ends of the human being.” Such an account proposes not only a description of human behaviour, but a standard of moral action and a foundation for human rights. Maritain's adopts the view that this law is not only related to human nature, but is known naturally. He believes that, given his arguments concerning the metaphysical and epistemological dimensions, we have a historically sensitive version of a natural law theory that accords with human experience, that bridges the is/ought gap, and that explains how differences in moral knowledge do not count against a natural law view. If we take this approach-an approach that Maritain believes is rooted in St Thomas-Maritain believes that one can respond to at least some of the major criticisms of natural law theory. There is, of course, more to a natural law theory than an account of its metaphysical and epistemological dimensions. Clearly, more needs to be said concerning its relation to other kinds of law (e.g., what he calls 'the common law' or law of civilizations, the positive law, and the divine law-i.e., to God or divine reason). We also need to specify what exactly we know of natural law. (Do we know the all the precepts of the natural law in the same way? Is there any priority among these precepts? Can there ever be any relativity in the natural law?) And it is also important to see how Maritain's account compares with other natural law theories, especially the 'rationalist' accounts that were popular in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, it is clear from the discussion throughout this essay that Maritain's theory is not one that one should hastily reject-and that it should be included among the major moral theories of today.