從西方認知科學探討儒家自我知識的可信度

An Investigation on the Reliability of Confucian Self-knowledge Based on Western Cognitive Science

10.7065/MRPC.200910.0149

冀劍制(Chienchih Chi)

自我知識 ； 儒家 ； 認知科學 ； 實踐型知識 ； 隱晦的學習 ； Self-knowledge ； Confucianism ； Cognitive Science ； Practical Knowledge ； Implicit Learning

哲學與文化

36卷10期（2009 / 10 / 01）

149 - 161

繁體中文

作為儒學思想核心的「仁」、「義」、或是「良知」都屬於一種需要被開啟的自我知識，人們必須經過某些實踐（或所謂的修行）來獲得這種知識。但是，依賴這種需要被開啟的自我知識的哲學體系卻因缺乏客觀的說服力而較不被西方哲學界所肯定，甚至被當作一種宗教來研究。然而，近年來西方認知科學與哲學的發展針對這種需要藉由實踐來開啟的知識的認知過程的把握有著顯著的進步，我們可以藉此新發展來分析儒家哲學中各種知識的可信度，甚至為儒學建立起更有說服力的基礎找到一個更好的途徑。

As key concepts in Confucianism, ”Ren”, ”Yi”, and ”conscious” can be considered as self-knowledge that needs to be revealed by practice. However, since self-knowledge centered philosophical systems are not objectively persuasive, many western philosophers do not take them seriously and even consider them a religion. However, the newly development of western philosophy and cognitive science may make self-knowledge more objective. Based on this, we can use this new development to find a way of how to make Confucianism more objectively persuasive.