人倫和基本益品

Human Relationships and Primary Goods

10.7065/MRPC.201005.0003

鄧小虎(Siu-Fu Tang)

人倫 ； 基本益品 ； 自我 ； 儒家 ； 自由主義 ； Human Relationships ； Primary Goods ； Self ； Confucianism ； Liberalism

哲學與文化

37卷5期（2010 / 05 / 01）

3 - 18

繁體中文

當代自由主義認為每一個體都有基本自由和權利，都能夠並且應該成為一自主的人。因為人是自主的，他們有權決定自己的人生方向和價值追求。政府不應該干涉個人的自主追求，也不應該將某一套整全的價值觀念強加於個人。政府應該做的，只是保障個人的自由和權利，並提供基本條件以利個人的人生和價值追求。本文嘗試從儒家的立場回應當代自由主義這種對自我和價值的看法。 本文主要想進行兩部分的工作：其一，通過對先秦儒家的詮釋，探究先秦儒家的核心關懷－以禮樂秩序為主導的人倫關係－是否和當代自由主義的自我理解相容。特別是，假定我們接受這種自我理解，儒家的人倫關係是否可能被視為一種基本益品？其二，嘗試釐清儒家人倫關係所預設的自我理解，並且探究這種儒家式的自我理解是否可用以修正甚或取代當代自由主義的自我理解。

Contemporary liberalism maintains that every individual has basic liberties and rights, and that every individual could and should become an autonomous being. Every autonomous person has the right to determine their own life vision and values. Government should not interfere with an autonomous person's life pursuit, and should not enforce any comprehensive doctrine. The role of government is only to protect individual's liberties and rights, and to provide basic goods that are necessary for an individual's pursuit of values and life fulfilment. This paper attempts to respond to such an idea of self and values of liberalism from the perspective of Confucianism. This paper has two objectives. First, through an interpretation of Pre-Qin Confucianism, this paper asks if the central concern of Confucianism, that is, human relationships mediated by rites, is compatible with liberalism's conception of person. Especially, granted that we accept such a conception of person, is it possible that Confucian human relationships be viewed as a kind of primary goods? Second, this paper tries to articulates the conception of person presupposed by Confucian human relationships and inquires if such a Confucian conception of person can modify or replace the liberal conception of person.

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