什麼是德性知識論?知識的本質與價值問題

What Is Virtue Epistemology? The Nature Problem and Value Problem of Knowledge

10.7065/MRPC.201202.0025

米建國(Chien-Kuo Mi)

德性 ； 德性知識論 ； Ernest Sosa ； 本質問題 ； 價值問題 ； 知識 ； 淹沒難題 ； Gettier難題 ； Virtue ； Virtue Epistemology ； Ernest Sosa ； Nature Problem ； Value Problem ； Knowledge ； Swamping Problem ； Gettier Problem

哲學與文化

39卷2期（2012 / 02 / 01）

23 - 46

繁體中文

本文將以「知識的本質」與「知識的價值」為主軸，以「本質問題」與「價值問題」為討論的核心，特別將專注於「Gettier難題」與「淹沒難題」。由於這個研究是在知識的本質與價值這個主軸下進行，所以當我們面對本質與價值問題時，我們意味著「知態的本質」與「知態的價值」：也就是我們把知識當作是一種成就，或者是一種由人類認知能力所獲致的成功，而不只是一種運氣或偶然所得到的結果，我們將著重這種成就與認知成功本身的價值所在。這個研究的最終目標是希望，在我們為Gettier難題與淹沒難題尋求回應的同時，也能為知識的本質問題，以及有關知識價值的相關難題，都能提供一個令人滿意的解決途徑與方案。有關知識本質與價值的問題，一個最直接與最普遍的問題在於：「什麼是知識？」 與「什麼是知識的價值？」這兩個問題。伴隨著這兩個普遍問題而來的，是在不同序列所出現的本質與價值問題。其中包括知識本質與價值的主要問題：如果知識並不等同於真信念，那麼知識是什麼？知識如何能比僅僅只是真的信念還要有價值？接下來要問的是第二序的知識本質與價值問題：知識如果不等同於證成的真信念，那麼知識是什麼？為什麼「知識」比起「那些近乎於知識卻又禁不起Gettier反例測試的真信念」還要有價值？最後還有第三序的問題：為什麼知識具有優先性與不可定義性？為什麼「知識」比起「那些近乎於知識卻又禁不起Gettier反例測試的真信念」不僅具有更高的價值，而且還具有其自身獨特或最終的價值？本文希望能夠釐清這些不同序列的知識本質與價值問題，同時也能展現這些不同問題的哲學意涵。本文的真正核心問題在回答：「什麼是德性知識論？」這個問題。透過鋪陳知識的本質與知識的價值問題，我們一方面可以掌握Sosa的德性知識論在當代知識論發展過程中的獨特地位，另一方面也可以看出回應本質問題與價值問題的最新創見。

What is knowledge? Why is knowledge valuable? In what way is knowledge more and better than merely true belief? This is a primary nature and value problems posed in Plato's Meno and Theaetetus. This paper focuses upon the nature problem and value problem of knowledge, especially upon ”the Gettier problem” and ”the swamping problem”, which are the central problems in the new value-driven epistemology. It is hoped that a general solution to the Gettier problem and the swamping problem can be found, and that the nature problem and the problem regarding the value of knowledge in epistemology will be satisfactorily addressed. There are different levels of suspicion concerning the nature and the value of knowledge, beginning with the most general suspicion that knowledge has any nature and any distinctive value at all. It then follows with the primary concern that why knowledge is more and better than merely true belief, the secondary concern that why knowledge is not justified true belief and why knowledge is more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge, and the tertiary concern that why knowledge cannot be defined and why knowledge has not just a greater degree but also a different kind of value than whatever falls short of knowledge. This paper also attempts to explore what those different levels of suspicions or the nature and value problems of knowledge really involve, and to show the philosophical significances of them. As we shall see, the question regarding ”what virtue epistemology is” plays a central role in this paper. By exploring the nature problem and the value problem of knowledge, not only can we grasp the unique position of Sosa's virtue epistemology in the current development of epistemology, but also get a clear perspective of facing the nature problem as well as the value problem.

1. Brady, M. S.(collected),Pritchard, D.(collected)(2003).Moral and Epistemic Virtues.Oxford:Blackwell.
2. Chisholm, Roderick(1957).Perceiving: A Philosophical Study.Ithaca:New York Cornell University Press.
3. Clark, Michael(1963).Knowledge and Grounds: A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper.Analysis,24,46-48.
4. Gettier, Edmund(1963).Is Justified True Belief Knowledge.Analysis,23,121-123.
5. Goldman, Alvin(1967).A Causal Theory of Knowing.The Journal of Philosophy,64,357-372.
6. Greco, John(2010).Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity.Cambridge University Press.
7. Hendricks, V.(collected),Pritchard, D. H.(collected)(2007).New Waves in Epistemology.Palgrave Macmillan.
8. Jones, Ward(1997).Why Do We Value Knowledge?.American Philosophical Quarterly,34(4),423-439.
9. Kvanvig, Jonathan(2003).The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.Cambridge University Press.
10. Lehere, Keith,Paxson, Thomas(1969).Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief.The Journal of Philosophy,66,225-237.
11. Nozick, Robert(1981).Philosophical Explanations.Harvard University Press.
12. Oretske, Fred(1971).Conclusive Reasons.Australasian Journal of Philosophy,49,1-22.
13. Plantinga, Alvin(1997).Warrant and Accidentally True Belief.Analysis,57,140-145.
14. Plato,Hamilton, Edith(ed.),Cairns, Huntington(ed.),Guthrie, W. K. C.(trans.)(1963).The Collected Dialogues of Plato.Princeton University Press.
15. Pritchard, Duncan(2009).Knowledge.Palgrave Macmillan.
16. Pritchard, Duncan,Millar, Alan,Haddock, Adrian(2010).The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations.Oxford University Press.
17. Reisner, A.(collected),Steglich-Petersen, A.(collected)(2011).Reasons for Belief.Cambridge University Press.
18. Sosa, Ernest(2010).Knowing Full Well (Soochow University Lectures in Philosophy).Princeton University Press.
19. Sosa, Ernest(2011).Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge.Oxford University Press.
20. Sosa, Ernest(2009).A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge.Oxford University Press.
21. Sosa, Ernest(1980).,未出版
22. Sosa, Ernest(1991).Knowledge in Perspective: Selecled Essays in Epistemology.Cambridge University Press.
23. Swinburne, Richard(2001).Epistemic Justification.Oxford University Press.
24. Swinburne, Richard(1998).Providence and the Problem of Evil.Oxford University Press.
25. Williamson, Timothy(2002).Knowledge and Its Limits.Oxford University Press.
26. Zagzebski, Linda(1996).Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.Cambridge University Press.
27. Zagzebski, Linda(2009).On Epistemology.Wadsworth Cengage Learning.

1. 羅雅純(2020)。德性資於學問－戴震知識論新釋。東吳中文學報，39，113-142。
2. 羅雅純(2021)。情感主義？智識主義？－論戴震「問學所得，德性日充」知識進路的道德觀。東華漢學，34，189-220。
3. 米建國(2014)。德性知識論的難題：反省知識。哲學與文化，41(3)，67-95。
4. 米建國(2014)。德性知識論與懷疑論：Linda Zagzebski《論知識論》。東吳哲學學報，29，95-123。