英文摘要
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The traditional doctrine of mind-nature is characterized by its application to "mind," "nature" and "feelings," uniting the moral motivation with the practical process while making the statements on mind-nature coherent; also, from this perspective, Xunzi's concept of human nature lacks the motivation for moral practice. However, the rationality of such a doctrine of mind-nature as a metaphysical perspective is also questioned by many scholars, as they think it is unable to address the feelings for material desires. Therefore, it is believed in this article that, while material desires and materialistic civilization of technology appeal to us, we can re-examine Xunzi's statements about the essence of nature and how to upgrade "rite" to the "supreme morality" and contemplate whether such "morality" has any social function. Meanwhile, we should reflect on the settings of Xunzi's doctrine and understand its theoretical position in order to avoid confusing the differentiated levels of comparisons and criticisms.
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