論Pritchard對極端懷疑論悖論的解決方案

On Pritchard's Solution to the Radical Skeptical Paradox

王文方(Wen-fang WANG)

懷疑論 ； 認知封閉性原則 ； 低度決定原則 ； 門閂性承諾 ； 認識論的選言主義 ； 釜底抽薪式的解決方案 ； Skepticism ； The Epistemic Closure Principle ； The Underdetermination Principle ； Hinge Commitments ； Epistemological Disjunctivism ； Undercutting Solution

哲學與文化

46卷5期（2019 / 05 / 01）

35 - 60

繁體中文

D. Pritchard（2016）分析了兩種極端懷疑論者常用的論證（或他所謂的「悖論」）及其背後的基本假設，並論證它們沒有統一的釜底抽薪式（undercutting）解決方案。這兩種論證中的一個訴諸了認知封閉性原則（the epistemic closure principle，ECP），而另一種則訴諸了低度決定原則（the underdetermination principle，UP）。為了徹底解決這兩種在他看起來沒有統一解決方案的懷疑論論證或懷疑論悖論的發生， Pritchard 訴諸了兩個不同的哲學看法──Wittgenstein的門閂性承諾（hinge commitment）以及McDowell的認識論選言主義（Epistemological Disjunctivism）──以便於分別消除這兩種悖論。本文的討論主要集中在訴諸於ECP的這種懷疑論悖論之上，但也會適時說明該悖論與訴諸UP的懷疑論悖論之間的關係。作者在這篇文章中論證了數件事情。首先，作者論證說，Pritchard的門閂性解決方案在解決訴諸ECP的懷疑論悖論上有許多困難，因而並不令人滿意。其次，作者論證說，在假設門閂性的解決方案能夠滿意解決訴諸ECP的懷疑論悖論的情況下，該方案其實可以進一步作為上述兩個懷疑論悖論的共同解決方案。最後，作者還論證說，Pritchard所描述的訴諸了跨時間版ECP的懷疑論悖論本身，其實有著嚴重的缺憾：該悖論的一部分（而非整體）便已經包含了一個讓懷疑論者無法接受的結果，因而，嚴格說起來，該悖論並不構成一個真正的「悖論」，或者說，懷疑論者至少不應該使用該悖論中的ECP版本去論證他的立場。

D. Pritchard (2016) analyzes two modern radical skeptical arguments (or what he calls 'radical skeptical paradoxes') and their presuppositions and argues that there is no uniformed undercutting solution to both of them. One of the two arguments appeals to a diachronic version of the epistemic closure principle (ECP), while the other appeals to a version of what he calls 'the underdetermination principle' (UP). In order to solve these skeptical paradoxes simultaneously, Pritchard appeals to two different philosophical ideas: Wittgenstein's idea about hinge commitments and McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism. This paper concentrates on the skeptical paradox that appeals to the diachronic ECP and Pritchard's solution to it, though it will also indicate their relationship to the one that appeals to UP when needed. The author argues several things in this paper. First, he argues that Pritchard's solution, one that appeals to Wittgenstein's idea of hinge commitments, to the skeptical paradox is not satisfactory for several reasons. Second, he argues that, were the solution workable, it could actually form a uniformed solution to both skeptical paradoxes. Finally, he argues that there is a serious problem in Pritchard's description of the skeptical paradox that appeals to the diachronic version of ECP: a proper part of the paradox has already contained some unacceptable result to the skeptic, so that, strictly speaking, there is no genuine paradox at all or, at least, the skeptic should not use the diachronic version of ECP to argue that we lack empirical knowledge about the external world.

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1. 王文方(2023)。對哲學的與邏輯的反例外論的質疑。哲學與文化，50(2)，43-60。