黃光國難題的體用觀：化解中西本體論的歧異

TIyong concept of Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem: Resolving the Differences between Chinese and Western's Ontology

陳復(Fu CHEN)

黃光國難題 ； 體用觀 ； 本體論 ； 中體西用 ； 多元主義方法論 ； 心體論 ； Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem ； TIyong Concept ； Ontology ； Chinese Learning Should Be Followed as the Essence ； Western Learning as the Practical Application ； Methodological Pluralism ； Nousism

哲學與文化

46卷10期（2019 / 10 / 01）

29 - 48

繁體中文

黃光國主張「中學為體，西學為用」背後有關體用觀的議題，藉由歷史脈絡的梳理，本文指出對「中體西用」的實質內涵會因人而有不同觀點，須深究其實際意思，張之洞將倫理道德視作「中體」，黃光國的主張比較接近於這個看法，然而如果倫理道德會隨著時間不斷更易，這顯然尚不能成為思想匯歸的源頭，但如果我們將其視作某種先驗性形式架構（transcendental formal structure），則不僅是倫理道德這些條目本身（諸如仁、義、禮），這些條目背後還應該要有「心體」（nous）來做機制，使其作為中國學問的基石，並接著指導實用層面的開展。本文主張藉由科學哲學的方法構築心體的微觀世界，來對應日用的生命世界；並藉由科學哲學的實踐應用心體的微觀世界，來影響日用的生命世界，彼此通過科學哲學形成雙向的善性循環，這是深層意義在回應《易經．繫辭傳》說的「君子之道」。本文梳理費依阿本德主張的「多元主義方法論」（methodological pluralism），提出「費依阿本德古典原則」（The Three Classic Principles of Feyerabend）與「費依阿本德演化原則」（The Three Evolving Principles of Feyerabend），冀圖讓多元主義方法論獲得更完整的落實路徑。本文指出：我們只能說中華思想沒有「西洋哲學的本體論」，不能說沒有「中華思想的本體論」，並且，體用觀不見得能完整涵蓋中華思想的本體論，因此，本文同意使用建構實在論（constructive realism）的觀點，尤其沈清松後來對建構實在論的衍生解釋，其三個階段的「外推」已可作為化解中西本體論歧異的橋梁，本文覺得應該將建構實在論當作策略性的工具，更細緻釐清出「心體論」（nousism），意即儒釋道對自性的關注，能經由外推的過程，讓「中華思想的本體論」跨越發展到可被視作「西洋哲學的本體論」，架構出深層意義的「中學為體，西學為用」。使得我們有機會藉由這種觀點來化解中西本體論的歧異。

Starting from the discussion of Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem, this paper clarifies the issues behind Hwang Kwang-Kuo Problem's proposition that ＂Chinese learning should be followed as the essence; western learning as the practical application＂. Through the combing of historical context, this paper points out that there are different opinions on the essence of ＂Chinese learning should be followed as the essence; western learning as the practical application＂ because of different people, and we must probe into its actual meaning. Zhang Zhidong regarded ethics and morality as the ＂Chinese essence＂, and Hwang Kwang-Kuo's opinion was closer to this view. However, if ethics and morality will change over time, this obviously cannot be the source of the flow of ideas. But if we regard it as a kind of a transcendental formal structure, it is not only the items of ethics and morality (such as benevolence, righteousness and propriety), but there should also be a mechanism of ＂nous＂ behind these items to make a mechanism to act as a cornerstone of Chinese learning, and then guide the development of practical aspects. This paper advocates that the microcosm of the mind is constructed by the method of philosophy of science, which corresponds to the daily life world, and that the micro world of mind is applied by the practice of philosophy of science to influence the daily life world and form a two-way cycle of goodness through philosophy of science. This is a profound meaning in response to the ＂way to be gentleman＂ in the The Great Appendix of The Book of Changes. This paper sorts out the ＂methodological pluralism＂ advocated by Feyerabend, and puts forward the ＂The Three Classic Principles of Feyerabend＂ and ＂The Three Evolving Principles of Feyerabend＂ to make the methodological pluralism more complete. This paper points out that we can only say that there is no ＂the ontology of Western philosophy＂ in Chinese, but we can not say that there is no ＂the ontology of Chinese thought＂ in Chinese. Moreover, the Tiyoug concept may not completely cover the ontology of Chinese thought. Therefore, this paper agrees to use the view of constructivist realism, especially Shen Qingsong's later derivative interpretation of constructive realism, whose three stages of ＂extrapolation＂ can be used as a bridge to resolve the differences between Chinese and Western ontology. This paper argues that constructive realism should regarded as a strategic tool, and the ＂nousism＂ should be clarified in detail, which means that Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism pay attention to the self. Through the process of extrapolation, ＂the ontology of Chinese thought＂ can be regarded as ＂the ontology of western philosophy＂, which constructs the deep meaning of ＂Chinese learning should be followed as the essence; western learning as the practical application＂.

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