题名

爭議和澄清

并列篇名

Disputing and Clarifying

作者

蒂莫西.威廉姆森(Timothy WILLIAMSON);徐召清(Zhaoqing XU)

关键词

哲學爭議 ; 澄清語詞 ; 概念分析 ; 理論建構 ; 清晰性 ; Philosophical Disputes ; Clarifying Terms ; Conceptual Analysis ; Constructive Theorizing ; Clarity

期刊名称

哲學與文化

卷期/出版年月

47卷8期(2020 / 08 / 01)

页次

3 - 39

内容语文

繁體中文;英文

中文摘要

哲學的爭議常常通過論證或對話來表達。對哲學家來說,演講通常不如問答環節重要,因為這才是演講者的論證和結論得到檢驗的時刻。提問者給出反例,找出謬誤,識別歧義;而回答者則為自己所珍視的想法做辯護。儘管哲學的問答也包括合作,但抗辯居於哲學實踐的核心。這與哲學的起點有關。正是在意識到別人的常識與自己的常識有衝突時,我們才發現常識的局限。而通過辯論,雙方都有機會測試自己起點的優勢和弱點,即使最後依然存在分歧,爭議雙方也可以改進各自的理論。有些哲學爭議能夠通過澄清語詞或概念而消除,但哲學並不等同於語詞或概念分析。一方面,模糊性在所難免,不可能讓詞語完全精確;另一方面,確實存在不包含任何混淆的真正的理論分歧。儘管概念真理和非概念真理的區分並不成立,但清晰性仍有價值:其不在於提供無可置疑的標準,而在於讓推理的錯誤清晰可見。

英文摘要

Philosophical disputes are often expressed through arguments or dialogues. For philosophers, a lecture often matters less than the question-and-answer period, because that is when the speaker's arguments and conclusions are put to the test. Questioners propose counterexamples, allege fallacies, and discern ambiguities. The speaker fights for the life of their cherished ideas. Although the question and answer of philosophy also includes cooperation, the adversary lies in the core of philosophy practice. This is related to the starting point of philosophy. It is when we realize that there is a conflict between other people's common sense and our own that we find the limitations of common sense. Through the debate, both sides have the opportunity to test their strengths and weaknesses. Even if there are still disagreements in the end, both sides can improve their theories. Some philosophical disputes can be eliminated by clarifying words or concepts, but philosophy is not equivalent to clarifying word or conceptual analysis. On the one hand, vagueness is inevitable and it is impossible to make words completely accurate; on the other hand, there are real theoretical disagreements that do not contain any ambiguity. Although the distinction between conceptual truth and non conceptual truth does not hold, clarity is still valuable: it is not about providing indisputable standards, but about making the errors of reasoning clear.

主题分类 人文學 > 人文學綜合
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