思想實驗與資訊不對稱：從懷疑和自我懷疑的角度看

Thought Experiments and Information Asymmetries: From the Perspective of Doubt and Self-Doubt

劉靖賢(Jingxian LIU)；王海若(Hairuo WANG)

思想實驗 ； 信息不對稱 ； 直觀 ； 對稱原則 ； 自尊原則 ； Thought Experiment ； Information Asymmetry ； Intuition ； Symmetry Principle ； Self-Respect Principle

哲學與文化

47卷8期（2020 / 08 / 01）

77 - 92

繁體中文

思想實驗的案例方法被廣泛運用在當代分析哲學中。這種方法用直觀反例來質疑傳統界定的合理性。實際上，從傳統界定和直觀反例所得出的矛盾可以被看作邏輯悖論。正如邏輯悖論具有對角線結構，思想實驗包含資訊不對稱。如果這種資訊不對稱可以被識別為不一致，那麼相應的直觀反例是不合理的。資訊不對稱所導致的不一致性可以被區分為兩種情況：公開和隱藏。前者違反了對稱原則，後者違反了自尊原則。這兩個原則分別是直觀反例所應該體現的外在融貫性與內在穩定性。

Thought experiments as a method are widely applied in contemporary analytic philosophy. The method poses challenges to a traditional definition by an intuitive counterexample. Actually, such a counterexample is analogous to a logical paradox. Just as a logical paradox relies on the diagonal structure, such a counterexample relies on the information asymmetry. If the information asymmetry in a counterexample could be identified as inconsistent, then such a counterexample is implausible. The inconsistency derived from information asymmetries can be categorized as two cases: overt and concealed. The former results from the violation of the symmetry principle, while the latter from the violation of the self-respect principle. These two principles correspond respectively to the external coherence and the internal stability of a situation.

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