感知中的「立義內容－立義」範式與所予的神話

The ＂Apprehensional Content-Apprehension＂ Schema of Perception and The Myth of The Given

鄭辟瑞(Pirui ZHENG)

胡塞爾 ； 塞拉斯 ； 「立義內容－立義」範式 ； 所予的神話 ； 填料 ； Husserl ； Sellars ； The ＂Apprehensional Content-Apprehension＂ Schema ； The Myth of the Given ； Filler

哲學與文化

47卷11期（2020 / 11 / 01）

27 - 42

繁體中文

麥克道威爾將塞拉斯對所予的攻擊和戴維森對「圖式－內容」二元論的攻擊等量齊觀，一些胡塞爾學者也將胡塞爾的「立義內容－立義」範式作為「圖式－內容」二元論的一種變樣加以批判，並且堅持認為胡塞爾最終拋棄了這一範式。然而，對胡塞爾文本的考察表明，胡塞爾並未完全拋棄這一範式，這看起來證明了，胡塞爾的現象學承諾了所予的神話。本文嘗試通過闡釋胡塞爾的後期文本，尤其是《被動綜合分析》中關於「充實性的填料」和「非充實性的填料」的區分及其相互轉換的可能性學說，證明胡塞爾的現象學並未陷入所予的神話，他的認識論使一種沒有所予的神話的「圖式－內容」二元論得以可能。

McDowell equates Sellars's attack on the Given with Davidson's attack on the dualism of scheme and content. Some Husserl scholars critically argue that Husserl's ＂apprehensional content-apprehension＂ schema is a variation of the scheme-content dualism and insist that Husserl finally abandoned this schema. However, a careful study of Husserl's text shows that Husserl never abandoned this schema completely, which seems to prove that Husserl's phenomenology is committed to the myth of the Given. By looking into Husserl's later texts, especially his distinction between ＂fulfilling fillers＂ and ＂non-fulfilling fillers＂ as well as the possibility of their transformation into each other in Analyses concerning Passive Synthesis, the present article intends to argue that Husserl's phenomenology does not fall prey the myth of the Given and his epistemology makes it possible for a scheme-content dualism without the myth.

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