| 题名 |
The Problem of Irrational Humans in a Rational Cosmos in Cheng Yi's Philosophy |
| 并列篇名 |
論程頤哲學合理的世界與不合理的人間的問題 |
| 作者 |
尹錫珉(Seokmin YOON)；朱光鎬(Kwang-ho JOO) |
| 关键词 |
Heavenly Principle ； Human Desires ； Substance and Function ； Apparent and Hidden ； Irrational Humans ； Rational Cosmos ； 天理 ； 人欲 ； 體用 ； 顯微 ； 不合理人 ； 合理世界 |
| 期刊名称 |
哲學與文化 |
| 卷期/出版年月 |
47卷12期（2020 / 12 / 01） |
| 页次 |
155 - 168 |
| 内容语文 |
英文 |
| 中文摘要 |
Cheng Yi belongs to the daoxue (道學) school of the Northern Song dynasty, which recognized the World as rational, and as such viewed all beings as governed by li (理). However, he also raised the issue of a moral subject through a discussion of the tension between tianli (天理) and renyu (人欲). But how can an irrationality like human desire exist within the rational cosmos governed by li? Does that mean that the order of li is not thorough? Mou Zongsan argued that Cheng Yi's li exists without action. But this makes Cheng Yi's famous remark that there is only one source for both the substance and the function, and there is no gap between what is apparent and what is hidden (體用一源, 顯微無間), which argues for the rational order governing all phenomena, a failed thesis. Cheng Yi detours the ontological discourse by transforming the problem of irrational humans within a rational cosmos into a problem of emotions in moral subjects. This transformation played an important role in shifting the focus of Neo-Confucianism from cosmology and ontology to human emotions. |
| 英文摘要 |
程頤站在以世界看成為合理的北宋傳統中。他主張世界中的所有存在者都受到理的支配。不過，他通過「天理」和「人欲」的對立來，同時主張倫理主體的自律性問題。如果是這樣，理支配之下的合理世界中，人欲等的不合理性，則從何來的呢？是不是理的支配不夠徹底？牟宗三先生主張程頤的理「只存有而不活動」。果真如此，程頤說的現象世界的合理性，即「體用一源，顯微無間」命題則不能成立嗎？他把合理世界與不合理人的問題，轉換為倫理主體的道德情感以及倫理選擇的問題，從而他回避一切存在論的難題。程頤之如此的轉回，把宋明理學的中心話題，從宇宙論或存在論轉換為道德心理學。 |
| 主题分类 |
人文學 >
人文學綜合 |
| 参考文献 |
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