康德內感覺學說新解

Kant's Theory of Inner Sensations: A New Interpretation

梁亦斌(Yibin LIANG)

康德 ； 內感覺 ； 經驗雜多 ； 現象意識 ； 內經驗 ； Kant ； Inner Sensations ； Empirical Manifold ； Phenomenal Consciousness ； Inner Experience

哲學與文化

48卷4期（2021 / 04 / 01）

159 - 175

繁體中文

康德認為內感和外感一樣產生自己的經驗雜多（即感覺）嗎？占主導地位的不類似論者認為不是。雖然這個觀點面臨諸多問題，但類似論者也無法對內感覺提出可信闡釋。這個僵局源於雙方都預設的一種對康德內感理論的錯誤闡釋。通過分析隱暗表象、自我刺激、領會和注意等概念，我對康德的內感覺學說進行了全新的闡釋：和一些意識高階理論者一樣，康德區分了經驗內容和現象意識，他認為外感產生沒有被現象意識所伴隨的經驗內容，而內感產生現象意識。因此，外知覺的現象性質就是內感的經驗雜多即內感覺。新闡釋解決了長久以來內感覺帶來的爭論，為類似論做了新辯護，澄清了《純粹理性批判》的一個核心概念，並且避免了康德先驗觀念論無法適用於內經驗這個核心疑難。

Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant's doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I argue that this deadlock can be traced back to an inadequate understanding of inner sense shared by both sides. Drawing upon an analysis of the notion of obscure representations, I offer an alternative interpretation of inner sense with a special regard to self-affection, apprehension, and attention. From this basis, I will infer that outer sense delivers sensory content that is initially and intrinsically unaccompanied by phenomenal consciousness; inner sense contributes by endowing such content with phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, phenomenal qualities can be regarded as the sensory manifold of inner sense. This alternative interpretation solves the long-standing dispute concerning inner sensations and would further illuminate Kant's notion of inner experience.

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