题名 |
從「福」概念的含義變化看牟宗三的圓善論 |
并列篇名 |
Understanding Mou Zongsan's Perfect Good Theory from Changes in the Meaning of the Concept of Happiness |
作者 |
肖雄(Xiong XIAO) |
关键词 |
牟宗三 ; 康德 ; 圓善 ; 幸福 ; 自我滿意 ; 永(天、至)福 ; Mou Zongsan ; Immanuel Kant ; Perfect/Highest Good ; Happiness ; Self-contentment ; Bliss |
期刊名称 |
哲學與文化 |
卷期/出版年月 |
48卷7期(2021 / 07 / 01) |
页次 |
43 - 60 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
聚焦於「福」概念,本文通過分別考察康德與牟宗三對該概念的使用情況,發現兩者在解決德福一致的進程中,均有從現象義的幸福滑向本體義的永福之趨勢。牟宗三接過康德的至善問題,認可其關於德福必然結合的根據在本體界、上帝只能創造物自身的說法;另一方面又根據東方的傳統,肯認自由意志的真實性及其在今世可以達至完全的神聖性,從而取消了靈魂不朽與上帝存在的懸設,明確與德性一致的福是物自身意義上的永福。我們或許可以說牟宗三未能處理現象義的幸福與德性如何一致的問題,但卻不能說他歪曲了康德,因他只是以異於基督教的傳統,同時在遵守康德哲學基本框架的前提下,解答了康德的問題。 |
英文摘要 |
Focusing on the concept happiness or well-being, this paper examines respectively the employment of the concept both by Immanuel Kant and Mou Zongsan, then find that the two philosophers both have the tendence of sliding from phenomenal happiness to noumenal bliss in the process of solving the Highest Good problem. Mou takes over Kant's Highest Good problem, and accepts his view that happiness proportion to virtue is possible only in the noumenal world and the God can only create thing in itself on one hand, admits the facticity of free will and that human being can reach holy virtue in the life according to the East tradition, makes clear that the well-being in Highest Good is the happiness in the sense of noumenon, and cancels the postulation of the immortality of the soul and existence of the God consequently on the other hand. We may say that Mou fails to solve the problem of phenomenal happiness proportion to virtue, but not that he misunderstands Kant, for that he just solves Kant's problem based on both the fundamentals of Kant's philosphy and the East tradition. |
主题分类 |
人文學 >
人文學綜合 |
参考文献 |
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