题名 |
有無自我問題的現象學研究 |
并列篇名 |
Phenomenological Research on the Problem of I & no I |
作者 |
岳富林(Fu-lin YUE) |
关键词 |
自我 ; 個體化 ; 中心化 ; 前反思自身意識 ; The I ; Individualization ; Centralization ; Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness |
期刊名称 |
哲學與文化 |
卷期/出版年月 |
48卷12期(2021 / 12 / 01) |
页次 |
157 - 171 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
胡塞爾從經驗自我到純粹自我的轉變在現象學界引發對有無自我問題的討論。沙特、古爾維奇根據意識流的自足性駁斥純粹自我的必要性,宣導一門非本我論現象學;反之,馬爾巴赫、紮哈維分別從個體化、中心化與前反思自身意識論證純粹自我的合法性,從而維護胡塞爾的本我論現象學。在對馬爾巴赫和紮哈維的觀點進行修正、補充與整合的基礎上,本文將為本我論現象學一方提供辯護。 |
英文摘要 |
Husserl's transition from empirical I to pure I triggered the discussion about the problem of I & no I in phenomenological circle. Sartre and Gurwitsch criticized the necessity of pure I by self-sufficiency of consciousness stream, and essentially advocated a kind of non-egological phenomenology. On the contrary, Marbach and Zahavi demonstrated the legitimacy of pure I by individualization, centralization and pre-reflective self-consciousness respectively, and argued for egological phenomenology. Through revising, complementing, integrating Marbach and Zahavi's views, this paper defends egological phenomenology. |
主题分类 |
人文學 >
人文學綜合 |
参考文献 |
|