良知可否了生死？－鄧豁渠對儒家生死觀的挑戰及其迴響

Can One Be Liberated from Death with Liangzhi?-Deng Huoqu's Challenges to Confucian View on Life and Death and the Responses

劉琳娜(Linna LIU)

鄧豁渠 ； 良知 ； 生死 ； 先天 ； 性命 ； Deng Huoqu ； Liangzhi (The Innate Knowledge) ； Life and Death ； Xiantian (A Priori) ； Xing-ming (Human Nature and Destiny)

哲學與文化

49卷8期（2022 / 08 / 01）

165 - 180

繁體中文

鄧豁渠「良知無法了生死」的觀點是晚明士人探討性命之學的風潮中一個特殊的聲音。他從陽明心學入手探究生死，在確立了「先天與後天不相聯屬」的學問結構之後，轉而批評儒者「沾情念」、「認神識為性」，質疑儒家生死觀的有效性。他的觀點在當時引起了強烈的反響，耿定向、趙貞吉、管志道、永覺元賢等人分別從儒家、佛教和儒佛會通的視角對其言行進行了評論。這場思想交鋒揭示了儒家在建立生死論述時可能面對道德性和超越性的衝突問題。

Deng Huoqu's point of view that ＂we cannot be liberated from death with liangzhi＂ is a special voice in the discourse of human nature and destiny in the late Ming Dynasty. He was a follower of Wang Yangming at the beginning, but finally turned to criticize Wang's key concept of liangzhi. After establishing a dichotomous view of the ultimate truth in which the metaphysical world and physical world are totally separated, Deng argued that Confucians are attached to qingshi (emotional delusions), therefore cannot liberate themselves from death. His challenges to Confucianism evoked a number of responses. Geng Dingxiang, Zhao Zhenji, Guan Zhidao and Yongjue Yuanxian made comments on his words and actions from perspectives of Confucianism, Buddhism and Syncretism. The debate revealed the tension between morality and transcendency that Confucians may face when establishing the philosophy of life and death.

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