從評價論證的相對性來看邏輯系統的選擇問題

Theory Choice: From the Viewpoint of the Relativity of Assessing Arguments

蘇慶輝(Ching-Hui SU)

邏輯反例外論 ； 邏輯例外論 ； 邏輯多元論 ； 邏輯相對主義 ； Logical Anti-exceptionalism ； Logical Exceptionalism ； Logical Pluralism ； Logical Relativism

哲學與文化

50卷2期（2023 / 02 / 01）

77 - 96

繁體中文;英文

根據邏輯反例外論（logical anti-exceptionalism），邏輯跟科學一樣，不具有特殊的地位，也是可修改的。不過，有趣的是，在邏輯反例外論的陣營中，對於「邏輯反例外論支援了哪一個邏輯？」這個問題的答案眾說紛紜；例如，Timothy Williamson認為經典邏輯受到了邏輯反例外論的支持，但是Graham Priest卻主張邏輯反例外論支持了非經典邏輯。對於兩人之間的分歧，Ole Thomassen Hjortland的診斷是：每個人在理解「什麼是邏輯理論」時，存在分歧。據此，Hjortland進一步論證，邏輯多元論（logical pluralism）可以為邏輯反例外論提供可信的支持。本文試圖為邏輯相對主義（logical relativism）辯護，主張我們對論證有效性的判斷是相對於模型的，而「要挑選哪些模型來評價論證？」是一個實用（pragmatic）問題，依賴在評價者的目的。按此思路，「邏輯是可修改的」這個論點中的「可修改的」會被解讀為「用來評價論證的模型可以根據實用目的而改變的」。據此，我們可以進一步解釋邏輯跟科學之間的相同之處－邏輯跟科學一樣是後驗的（a posteriori）。

According to logical anti-exceptionalism, logic is not special at all, so logical theories are revisable, as scientific theories are. However, there is a disagreement among anti-exceptionalists: some people, like Timothy Williamson, argue that anti-exceptionalism opts for classical logic, whereas others, like Graham Priest, claim that anti-exceptionalism supports non-classical logic. Ole Thomassen Hjortland's diagnosis of their disagreement is that they understand logical theories in a different way. Then Hjortland offers an alternative account of logical theories such that anti-exceptionalism will be supported by logical pluralism. The present paper aims at arguing for a certain kind of logical monism, more specifically logical relativism, based on the relativity of assessing arguments. Whether a certain argument is good depends on whether the argument promote the probability of achieving the arguer's end-it is a pragmatic issue. Thus, just like scientific theories, logical theories are justified a posteriori.

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