模態與本質：當代模態本質主義認識論

Modality and Essence: The Epistemology of Contemporary Modal Essentialism

王聰(Cong WANG)

本質 ； 模態認識論 ； 模態邏輯 ； 模態形而上學 ； 模態語義學 ； Essence ； Modal Epistemology ； Modal Logic ； Metaphysics of Modality ； Semantics of Modality

哲學與文化

50卷9期（2023 / 09 / 01）

91 - 106

繁體中文;英文

對於模態與本質以及二者之間關係的研究，當代的模態認識論者都試圖從多維的角度去說明。如果把本質化約為模態，進而化約為有關可能世界的說明，這種本質的可能世界理論（Lewis的模態實在論）將面臨「可及性難題」；如果把模態化約為本質，以一種先驗的方式去獲得本質的知識，進而獲得模態知識，這種模態的先驗本質主義解釋仍就會面臨著一些問題，如限制性問題。依據模態的結構特性，一種「統一性」的模態認識論總是顧此而失彼，而「非統一性」的說明似乎更能避免這些問題，同時也能更好的讓我們捕捉到模態知識。

The contemporary modal epistemologists try to explain the relationship between modality and essence from a multi-dimensional perspective. If essence is reduced to modality and then reduced to the explanation of possible world, the theory of possible world of essence (Lewis' modal realism) will face the "accessibility problem"; If the modality is reduced to essence and the essential knowledge is acquired in a prior way, the prior essentialism of modality will still face some problems, such as the limitation problem. According to the structural characteristics of modal knowledge, a "unified" modal epistemology can't always hit the targets, while the "non-unified" explanation seems to be more able to avoid these problems and capture the modal knowledge better.

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