题名 |
隱蔽出擊抑或消極避戰-國軍第三戰區面對浙贛會戰的部署與肆應 |
并列篇名 |
The Deployment and Response of the Third War Zone's Headquarters for the Battle of Zhejiang and Jiangxi Provinces |
作者 |
張世瑛(Shih-ying Chang) |
关键词 |
中日戰爭 ; 第三戰區 ; 顧祝同 ; 蔣中正 ; 浙贛會戰 ; The Sino-Japanese War ; The Third War Zone ; Ku Chu-tung ; Chiang Kai-shek ; The Campaign of Zhejiang and Jiangxi |
期刊名称 |
國史館館刊 |
卷期/出版年月 |
67期(2021 / 03 / 01) |
页次 |
37 - 89 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
發生在1942年5-9月的浙贛會戰,可說是自珍珠港事變至1944年日軍發動一號作戰前中日兩國在中國境內,作戰區域最廣、戰役時間最長、雙方出動兵力最多的一場會戰,然而此役一直未受到研究者的太多關注。截至目前為止針對此役的研究,都集中在會戰中的衢州戰役與蔣中正的領導指揮,卻忽略了衢州戰役前的金華蘭谿戰役及其後的浙贛路打通作戰,以及實際肩負會戰成敗之責的「第三戰區」的角色。本文試圖在既有成果的基礎上,探討第三戰區面對此役究竟是如何部署、指揮、肆應及自我檢討。在浙贛會戰前,第三戰區已長期沒有大規模的戰事出現,日軍發動浙贛會戰的三個主要作戰目的為:1.擊潰第三戰區國軍部隊的有生力量;2.摧毀浙江省內的空軍基地,以阻止美軍利用空襲日本本土;3.奪取鐵軌、螢石等重要戰略軍需物資,這些目的均在沒有太大阻礙下完成。以往研究形成兩個對立觀點:大陸方面研究多批評蔣中正一再變更戰略、臨時放棄決戰,認為其只想要避戰以保存實力;臺灣方面研究則多肯定第三戰區在蔣中正避免決戰、保存戰力、襲擾日軍的指示下,改採隱蔽出擊的戰法,順利達成浙贛會戰所預設的避敵鋒芒、伺機反擊的作戰目標。然而從作戰過程來看,國軍顯然是隱蔽有餘、出擊不足,但更大的原因在於國軍受限於組織、訓練及觀念,除少數部隊外根本無法有效執行隱蔽出擊的任務。此役由於日軍在取得預定戰果後迅速退回原陣地,國軍對外宣稱收復所有失土,帳面上看來損失不大,因此對外掩飾了作戰不力的敗績。 |
英文摘要 |
The of Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, which lasted from May to September 1942, was one of the largest military operations in the Sino-Japanese War after Pearl Harbor and before the Ichigo offensive in 1944. This important episode of the war, however, has not received sufficient scholarly attention. To this date most studies related to the campaign have focused on the Battle of Quzhou and Chiang Kai-shek's direction of that battle, while ignoring the battle of Jinhua-Lanxi prior to it, the battles along the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Railway following it, as well as the performance of China's Third War Zone which shouldered the actual responsibilities of conducting the campaign. The present article intends to amend this weakness in existing scholarship by examining the deployment, response and post-campaign reviews of the Third War Zone during the entire campaign. The Third War Zone had not experienced major military operations for quite some time before the Campaign of Zhejiang and Jiangxi. In 1942, the Japanese decided to launch this offensive in hopes of accomplishing three objectives: 1) to eliminate the Nationalist effectives in the Third War Zone; 2) to destroy the airfields in Zhejiang Province so as to prevent the Americans from using them in attacking Japan; and 3) to seize critical strategic materials such as railway tracks and fluorite. They accomplished all of these without much difficulty in the campaign. Two distinct views emerge in the current scholarship on this operation. Studies in Mainland China generally criticize Chiang Kai-shek for his repeated changes in battle plans and for his decision to avoid confrontations with the Japanese, arguing that he was more concerned with preserving his military strength than with fighting the enemy. Studies in Taiwan, on the other hand, largely approve the handling of the campaign by the Third War Zone as it followed Chiang's order to avoid frontal conflicts, preserve military strength, and harass the Japanese by making covert attacks. This, according to Taiwan scholars, had been the main objective of the Nationalists in the first place. Upon closer observation, this article finds that the Nationalist forces were mainly taking cover rather than launching attacks. Hampered by poor organization, insufficient training and a problematic mind-set, most of those forces were unable to conduct effective covert attacks. As the Japanese quickly withdrew upon achieving their campaign objectives, the Chinese recovered all of the lost territories. Both China and Japan therefore claimed to be the victor afterward, and the Chinese military were able to cover up its many defeats during the campaign. |
主题分类 |
人文學 >
歷史學 |
参考文献 |
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