Profit-Maximization Models for a Manufacturer-Retailer Channel under Consignment and Revenue Sharing Contract

在寄賣與營收分享的合約下發展產銷通路之利潤最大化模式

10.29977/JCIIE.200809.0007

陳振明(Jen-Ming Chen)；鄭弘良(Hung-Liang Cheng)；簡美珍(Mei-Chen Chien)

通路協調 ； 賽局理論 ； 寄賣 ； 營收分享 ； 上架費 ； channel coordination ； game theory ； on consignment ； revenue-sharing

工業工程學刊

25卷5期（2008 / 09 / 01）

413 - 422

英文

在寄賣與營收分享合約下，製造商決定銷售商品的零售價格，維持擁有商品的所有權；商品售出後，零售商扣除一部份合約所約定的比例，再將其餘的部分交給製造商。本研究採用Stackelberg領導者－追隨者的遊戲理論，模式化此一決策制定的程序。在此一通路結構下，零售商是領導者，他制定並提供製造商一營收分享的比例合約；製造商是追隨者，她決定銷售商品的零售價格。在價格敏感的線性需求函數下，本研究同時探討集中式和分散式的通路關係，並推導出分析結果。結果顯示，在不合作的通路結構下，零售商傾向於決定較高的營收分享比例，而製造商則會選擇較高的零售價格，導致一個較低的通路利潤；相對地，在合作的通路結構下，通路能達到百分之百的效率，意即能產生和集中式通路一樣多的利潤。

Under a consignment contract with revenue sharing, a manufacturer decides on the retail price of displayed products, and retains ownership of the goods. For each item sold, the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the manufacturer. We model the decision-making of the two firms as a Stackelberg game. The retailer, acting as the leader, offers the manufacturer a revenue sharing contract, which specifies the percentage allocation of sales revenue between herself and the manufacturer. The manufacturer, acting as a follower, sets a self-interest retail price as a response. Using a price-sensitive linear demand function, we derive analytic solutions for both the centralized and decentralized regimes of the channel. We proved that the retailer tends to set a higher percentage allocation of the revenue and the manufacturer tends to choose a higher price under the non-cooperative game, which leads to a lower channel profit. Under the cooperative game, the channel can reach 100 percent efficiency, i.e., it can generate as much profit as the centralized channel can.

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