英文摘要
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Consider a three-firm model of spatial competition in which consumers are uniformly distributed along a line segment. Two of the three firms have the opportunity to cooperate to maximize their joint profits. In two-stage non-cooperative Cournot game with location choice, this study first derives the necessary condition in which two of the firms cooperate rather than make independent decisions regarding quantities and locations. This study then identifies the optimal locations of the three firms. Under the linear demand assumption, this study shows the following: First, when the transportation cost is high, two of the firms have an incentive to cooperate. Second, whether the products among competitive firms are substitutes or complements, a rival will be located at the center, while the two cooperating firms will be located equidistant from the rival firm. Furthermore, when the products are substitutes (complements) and the transportation cost are increased, the two cooperating firms will move slightly away from (closer to) their competitor.
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参考文献
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連結:
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