以賽局理論建立捷運車站開發審議之協議機制

Negotiation Mechanism for MRT Station Development Review Based on the Game Theory

10.6128/CP.201912_46(4).0001

簡龍鳳(Lung-Feng Chien)；徐國城(Kuo-Cheng Hsu)

車站開發 ； 變更審議 ； 賽局理論 ； 協議機制 ； Station development ； Conversion review ； Game theory ； Negotiation mechanism

都市與計劃

46卷4期（2019 / 12 / 31）

249 - 270

繁體中文

捷運車站開發具有創造聚集經濟累積效果，亦會造成公共設施服務擁擠效果。在土地使用變更審議隱含協議空間下，議題的焦點在於變更土地使用強度之開發利益與回饋公共設施之間如何取得均衡。因此，變更審議與工程建設二部門，不單僅強調決議通過與否，而是更應關注一連串的協議過程及內涵，方能降低協調與衝突之交易成本，提高土地資源配置效率。本文旨在捷運車站開發審議過程中，運用賽局理論之協議分析方法，經由個案分析以解釋雙方協議過程的相依性結構，進而建構一協議機制。本文假定協議雙方在資訊對稱之情況下，經由範例說明本機制具可操作性，期能作為政府審議捷運車站開發時之參考。

The MRT station development has created an economic agglomeration effect. It also causes external congestion of public facilities. While there exists a negotiated room during the review of land use conversion, the crux is how to reach an equilibrium between development revenues of rezoning and feedback of public facilities. Therefore, the review sector and construction sector are not only interested in the results of the review but are also concerned about the process of negotiation, which may reduce the cost of transaction for promoting the allocation efficiency of resources. This study applied game theory to analyze the review process of the MRT station development, which explains an interdependent structure of agreement process, and then establishes a negotiation mechanism. The simulation found that, when information symmetry exists, the negotiation mechanism is operational, and it could be used as a reference for governments to review the MRT station development.

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