题名

關稅政策、環境政策與福利效果之析

并列篇名

Tariff Policy, Environmental Policy, and Welfare Effects Analysis

DOI

10.29765/TEI.200401.0001

作者

賴育邦(Bong Yu Lai);王嘉慧(Chia-Hui Wang)

关键词

策略性貿易 ; 環境政策 ; 貿易自由化 ; 污染稅 ; strategic trade ; environmental policy ; trade liberalization ; pollution taxes

期刊名称

經濟研究

卷期/出版年月

40卷1期(2004 / 01 / 31)

页次

1 - 31

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

本文以一個兩國三地模型探討當進口國降低關稅時,對出口國環境政策之影響。藉由一個兩階段賽局的建立,本文發現當廠商進行數量競爭時,進口國調降關稅將促使出口國提高污染稅:但伴隨污染提高而來的卻是政府對廠商優惠的增加,以及更多的污染。此外,當廠商進行價格競爭時,出口國之污染稅將隨進口國關稅下降而增加,意謂著政府提高對廠商所課徵的出口稅。與數量競辭下的結果相較,此結果凸顯產品市場與政府政策間的密切關聯性。本文亦證明不論在數量競爭或是價競爭下,只要自由化前的關稅稅率不是太低,自由貿易均可使全球福利提升,卻也使出口國的環境品質更形惡化,且當進口國降低關稅,該國福利亦隨之減少,此將不利於自由化之推展。

英文摘要

We investigate the effects of the importing country's tariff cuts on the environmental pollicies of two competing exporting countries in a third market model. By building a two-stage game, we find that when the firms engage in a Cournot duopoly game, tariff cuts increase the exporting countries' pollution taxes. However, the increasing pollution taxes imply higher subsidies to the firms and result in more pollution emissions. In a Bertrand duopoly case, tariff cuts also increase the exporting countries' pollution taxes, indicating that the governments raise the export taxes on the firms. Moreover, we demonstrate that in both Cournot and Bertrand competition, trade liberalization will enhance world welfare, but degenerate the exporting countries' environments and lower the importing country's welfare.

主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
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