Stackelberg競爭下行銷組合定價策略之福利分析

Welfare Analysis of the Bundling Marketing Strategy in a Stackelberg Duopoly

10.29765/TEI.200401.0004

廖俊雄(Chun-Hsiung Liao)；許心怡(Hsin-Yih Hsu)

Hotelling需求 ； 行銷組合策略 ； Stackelberg價格競爭 ； 社會福利 ； Hotelling Demand ； Bundling Marketing Strategy ； Stackelberg Price Competition ； Social Welfare

經濟研究

40卷1期（2004 / 01 / 31）

97 - 129

繁體中文

本研究考量一個具有領導者與追隨者的多產品雙佔市場，二業者均生產二種完全互補的產品，其決定採取下列三種行銷組合策略之一：個別取價、單純組合定價與混合組合定價，之後業者進行Stackelberg價格競爭。研究發現，混合組合定價提供消費者多元化的選擇，是消費者最為滿意的定價方式，但在此定價方式下，卻引發業者間更為激烈之價格競爭，造成利差減少，因此在均衡時二業者均將採取相對較不競爭的個別取價策略。在社會福利方面，若社會福利之量以消費者剩餘佔較高權重，則此均衡策略將導致最低的社會福利水準；反之，此均衡策略將導致最高的社會福利水準。

This paper studies on a leader-follower duopoly in which each firm produces two perfectly complementary products. They choose one of the following three marketing stragegies: pure component pricing, pure bundling pricing and mixed bundling pricing; and then compete in a Stackelberg fashion. The results show that even though mixed bundling pricing provides more flexible choices to consumers, it triggers a more aggressive competition between firms. Hence, in the equilibrium both firms select less competitive pure component pricing. If consumer welfare deserves a bigger weight in the measurement of social welfare, the equilibrium strategy induces the lowest level of social welfare. Otherwise, it brings the highest of social welfare.

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