题名

Imperfect Competition and Common Resource Exploitation: An Analysis of Renewable Resource Management with Non-use Values

并列篇名

不完全競爭與共有資源的開發:一個具有非使用價值的再生性資源管理的分析

DOI

10.29765/TEI.200501.0001

作者

張文俊(Wen-Chun Chang)

关键词

共有資源開發 ; 非使用價值 ; 過度開發 ; common resource exploitation ; non-use value ; over-exploitation

期刊名称

經濟研究

卷期/出版年月

41卷1期(2005 / 01 / 31)

页次

1 - 44

内容语文

英文

中文摘要

本文分析在一個寡占市場下,非使用價值對於自然資源的開發管理之重要性。藉由建立一個雙占模型的分析架構,非使用價值、市場力量與共有資源間的相互關聯性在本文中被詳細探討。當共有資源的開發在資源開發者彼此間不合作的情形下,常引發過度開發的問題時,非使用價值與市場力量的存在卻具有減少開發的經濟誘因。因此,當非使用價值存在,寡占市場的共有資源開發之不效率程度將與在完全競爭市場下、不具有非使用價值的情況有所差異。共有資源開發的不效率程度,在本文中以寡占市場與具有非使用價值的架構下,對於不合作均衡、合作均衡與社會最適均衡等三種結果進行比較分析可以得知。本文的結果發現,不效率的程度,會因非使用價值與市場力量所引起的減少資源開發的經濟誘因,是否能夠完全抵銷共有資源過度開發的效果而有所不同。其中,非使用價值所扮演的角色是重要的,特別是當非使用價值的多寡會影響到寡占市場中不同廠商間的競爭程度。

英文摘要

This article analyzes the importance of non-use values in the management of natural resources under an oligopoly model. By constructing a duopolistic framework, the interaction among the effects of non-use values, market power, and common exploitation is investigated. While the problem of common exploitation often results in over-depletion without cooperation, the effects of non-use values and market power provide economic incentives for exploiters to reduce harvests. In the presence of non-use values, the extent of inefficiency caused by common exploitation in an oligopolistic market can substantially differ from what results from the model of a perfectly competitive market without non-use values. The non-cooperative equilibrium, the cooperated equilibrium, and the socially optimal equilibrium are characterized to examine the inefficiency caused by the problem of common exploitation under an oligopolistic framework with non-use values. It is found that the degree of inefficiency will depend on whether the economic incentives for conserving the resource stemming from non-use values and market power can completely offset the effect of common exploitation. The role of non-use value appears to be important, especially for the case that non-use values influence the results for different levels of competitiveness in the output market of oligopoly.

主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
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