题名 |
Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Rent-Shifting Incentives |
并列篇名 |
考慮利潤移轉效果之租稅競爭 |
DOI |
10.29765/TEI.200601.0001 |
作者 |
賴育邦(Yu-Bong Lai) |
关键词 |
租稅競爭 ; 公共財 ; 利潤移轉效果 ; Tax competition ; Public goods ; Profit-shifting effect |
期刊名称 |
經濟研究 |
卷期/出版年月 |
42卷1期(2006 / 01 / 31) |
页次 |
1 - 24 |
内容语文 |
英文 |
中文摘要 |
在典型的租稅競爭模型中,財貨市場為完全競爭,因此不會出現利潤移轉效果。本文將假設財貨市場為雙佔市場,並分析利潤移轉效果的出現將對國際間的資本稅競爭產生何種影響。本文建構一個兩階段賽局,在第二階段,兩個出口國的廠商在第三國市場進行數量或價格上的競爭。在第一階段,出口國則決定該國的資本稅稅率。在此架構下,出口國政府在決定稅率時,會試圖利用資本稅以移轉對手國的利潤,換言之,資本稅具有策略性貿易政策之性質。本文發現,當廠商進行數量競爭時,利潤移轉效果會使公共財提供過少的情況加劇;在價格競爭下,利潤移轉效果則會改善公共財提供過少的情況。本文進一步指出,在數量競爭下,出口國相互合作可增進彼此的福利;然而在價格競爭下,出口國的合作有可能使雙方的福利下降。 |
英文摘要 |
The tax competition literature usually specifies competitive product markets, so that the rent-shifting effect is overlooked. By incorporating an duopolistic product market, this paper considers two exporting countries that use capital taxes as devices to promote exports in a two-stage game. We find that when firms compete in terms of quantity, the rent-shifting effect aggravates the under-provision of public goods. However, when firms compete in terms of price, the rent-shifting effect reduces the inefficiency arising from tax competition. Moreover, we show that cooperation between exporting countries enhances the welfare of both countries in a Cournot duopoly, but this is not necessarily true in a Bertrand duopoly. |
主题分类 |
社會科學 >
經濟學 |
参考文献 |
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被引用次数 |