時間因素與競租－再探完全浪費假說

Time and Rent Seeking-A Reconsideration of Full Dissipation Hypothesis

10.29765/TEI.200607.0001

翁仁甫(Zen-Fu Ueng)；楊建成(Cheng-Chen Yang)

競租 ； 完全浪費假說 ； Rent Seeking ； Full Dissipation Hypothesis

經濟研究

42卷2期（2006 / 07 / 31）

137 - 150

繁體中文

本文延伸Tullock(1980)的競租(rent seeking)賽局分析，將競租活動的兩項跨期性質納入考慮：(1)就事前而言，進行競租活動的時間長度是不確定的；(2)雖然競租活動的時間長度無法確定，但此一時間的平均長度，通常會由於競租活動總花費的增加而縮短。我們發現：(1)當競租賽局的進入受到限制時，以標的租金值來衡量競租活動的社會成本，會發生高估的錯誤；(2)在競租者可以自由進入的情況下，競租文獻中：開放競租者自由進入競租賽局，會導致完全浪費(fully dissipated)的觀點並不正確。因此，我們進一步提出衡量競租社會成本的正確公式，並且發現就極小化競租社會成本而言，愈堅韌(tough)的政府愈佳。

This paper extends the familiar rent seeking game in Tullock (1980) to incorporate two inter-temporal aspects of rent seeking activities: (1) the length of time spent in contesting for a rent is uncertain ex ante, and (2) this length of time, though uncertain, is likely to decrease as the total amount of lobbying outlays increases. We find: (1) in the case of restricted entry, the value of contested prize will make the social cost of rent seeking overestimated; (2) in the case of free entry, the so-called full dissipation under free entry in the literature is not correct. We provide the correct formula to measure the social cost of rent seeking. In addition, we find that the tougher the government the better minimized the social cost of rent seeking.

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