台灣車體損失險上的動機效果

The Incentive Effect in the Comprehensive Automobile Insurance of Taiwan

10.6226/NTURM2006.17.1.31

汪琪玲(Kili C. Wang)

訊息不對稱 ； 道德風險 ； 動機效果 ； asymmetric information ； moral hazard ； incentive effect

臺大管理論叢

17卷1期（2006 / 12 / 01）

31 - 57

繁體中文

Li、Liu與Yeh(2006)利用台灣車體險市場跨年契約轉換資料，成功離析掉逆選擇，檢測出自負額會引發道德風險下的動機效果。依循該文獻，本文改從保障項目檢測市場的動機效果。在甲式轉丙式及乙式轉丙式保單，本文都得到動機效果的證據，隱含高保障契約，易讓投保人疏於小心。但在甲式轉乙式保單，本文無法確切斷定有動機效果，因為，若切除甲式的不明原因出險，無法得到正面的證據；若不切除，雖得到肯定結論，卻無法認定真為動機效果、還是擴大理賠範圍所致。透過理賠門檻值變化，本文發現保險公司在高額理賠時，有較強的稽核動機。同時，本文發現，契約自負額設計差異的干擾，並沒有扭曲論文中的檢定推論。

Using the data of switching contracts through years in comprehensive automobile insurance of Taiwan. Li, Liu, & Yeh (2006) successfully isolate the adverse selection problem and find deductible in insurance contract provide incentives on moral hazard. This paper follows their methodology to test the same problem in the same market from the view point of insurance contracts with different coverage items. This paper finds that incentive effect exists when policyholders switch their policies from contracts type A or B into contract type C. It implies that high coverage contracts may cause careless driving. But this paper can not confirm the incentive effect when the policyholders switch their policies from contract type A into contract type B. When the unknown reason claims are cut out. there is no evidence of incentive effect, hut when the unknown reason claims are included, the evidence existed. But we can not make sure that is the truly evidence of incentive effect, or that is only from more coverage items including more claims. We also found the evidence to support that insurance companies tighten auditing criteria when the claim amount rises. All outcomes in the paper are generally held despite different deductible designs.

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