保險經代人能否提供較佳的理賠服務品質？：台灣汽車責任保險實證

Do Insurance Brokers or Agents Provide Superior Claim Service Quality?: Empirical Evidence on Automobile Liability Insurance in Taiwan

10.6226/NTUMR.2017.NOV.RM104-004

劉俊廷(Chun-Ting Liu)；吳瑞雲(Jui-Yun Wu)；江朝峰(Chao-Feng Chiang)

保險經代制度 ； 直接簽單制度 ； 爭取理賠金額的服務 ； 理賠案件處理時效 ； insurance broker or agent system ； direct writer system ； claim amount coordination service ； claim processing efficiency

臺大管理論叢

27卷2S期（2017 / 05 / 01）

119 - 147

繁體中文

本文利用台灣汽車責任保險市場資料來驗證產品品質假說，亦即保險經代制度能提供顧客較佳的服務品質，因此能與較有效率的直接簽單制度共存於保險市場。本文從理賠服務觀點，並從兩方面考慮理賠服務品質：爭取理賠金額的服務與理賠案件處理時效。研究發現，在相同的體傷程度下，保險經代人在任意責任險的理賠案件，其理賠金額顯著高出直接簽單通路，顯示保險經代人相較於直接簽單通路能幫助顧客向保險公司爭取較高的理賠金額，此能力隨著受害人體傷程度的提高而跟著提高。研究亦發現不同通路在理賠案件處理時效上並無顯著差異。

This study uses claim data from the automobile liability insurance of Taiwan to verify the product quality hypothesis, which argues that the insurance broker or agent system can provide better service quality to customers, and thus can coexist with the efficient direct writer system. We depart from the viewpoint of claim service and consider two claim service indicators: negotiation service of claim amount and efficiency in claim processing. Results show that under the same degree of bodily injuries, the claim amount coordinated by the insurance broker or agent is significantly higher than that by the direct writer channel. This finding suggests that the insurance broker or agent outperforms the direct writer system in earning higher claim amount for customers. The results also reveal that the capability of the insurance broker or agent to earn higher claim amount for customers improves further with the increase in the degree of bodily injury of the victims. We find no evidence of the existence of a significant difference between different distribution channels in the efficiency of claim processing.

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