中國股權分置改革對於最終控制股東與關係人交易之關係的影響

The Impact of the Chinese Split-Share Structure Reform on the Relationship between Ultimate Controlling Shareholder and Related Party Transactions

10.6226/NTUMR.2017.JAN.A103-017

王文聖(Wen-Sheng Wang)；蔡子傑(Chi-Kit Choi)；李易政(I-Cheng Li)；洪榮華(Jung-Hua Hung)

控制股東 ； 關係人交易 ； 股權分置改革 ； ultimate controlling shareholder ； related party transactions ； split-share structure reform

臺大管理論叢

27卷2期（2017 / 06 / 01）

135 - 161

繁體中文

中國政府於2005年實施股權分置改革，以平衡非流通股東及流通股東的利益，減少控制股東剝奪少數股東財富的誘因。本研究以2002年至2013年間在深圳及上海交易所上市的公司為樣本，探討股權分置改革是否對控制股東從事關係人交易產生影響。透過PLS迴歸模型檢驗，實證發現國有控制股東在股權分置改革後減少進行關係人交易的下降幅度比非國有股東多；在國有控制股東樣本中，中央政府在股權分置改革後減少進行關係人交易的下降幅度比地方政府多。此外，第二大股東傾向與控制股東共謀而增加關係人交易的使用。本研究對於政策制定者及投資人具有管理意涵。

Chinese government implemented the split-share structure reform in 2005, with an attempt to eliminate controlling shareholders' incentive to expropriate the minority shareholders' wealth through aligning the interest of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Using the sample of all companies listed on the Shenzhen and the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the years from 2002 to 2013, the study scrutinizes the impact of the split-share structure reform on the relationship between ultimate controlling shareholder and related party transactions. Through the PLS regression models, empirical results show that related party transactions are reduced after the split share structure reform in firms controlled by state-owned firms, especially in firms controlled by the central government. In addition, the second-largest shareholder tends to collude with the controlling shareholders and increase the use of related party transaction after the reform. Our findings have implications for policy makers and investors.

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